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The Analytic Classroom
TODD E. PETTYS†
INTRODUCTION
We have learned so relatively well how to do one kind of
teaching that we sit Narcissus-like before the pool. We go on
teaching cases—and do too little teaching else. Well, then, so
be it.
— Karl Llewellyn

1

In this Article, I propose a shift in law schools’ approach
to teaching doctrinal courses. The proposal flows in large
part from three separate developments: (1) the rise of strong
economic headwinds in the market for legal education;2 (2)
the emergence of empirical evidence that law schools are
falling short of their goal of equipping students with
powerful analytic abilities that transcend the particular
doctrinal frameworks law schools teach;3 and (3) the
incipient revolution in higher education, with prestigious
universities now aggressively pursuing the opportunity to
provide the public with free or low-cost access to many of
their courses through the Internet.4

† Associate Dean for Faculty and H. Blair and Joan V. White Chair in Civil
Litigation, University of Iowa College of Law. The author thanks Karen
Anderson and Eric Bigley for their research assistance, and Eric Andersen,
Dorothy Evensen, Shelly Kurtz, Song Richardson, Caroline Sheerin, and James
Stratman for reading and commenting on earlier drafts.
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE
LAW AND LAW SCHOOL 146 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1960) (publishing a series
of lectures that Llewellyn delivered to students at the Columbia Law School
during the 1929–1930 academic year).
2. See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
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Prior to the recent contraction in the global economy,5
several forces—including a steady supply of applications for
admission,6 ever-higher tuition rates,7 and a robust job
market for law graduates8—shielded American law faculties
from having to confront the possibility that their three-year
programs of study might be less transformative than they
could be. Of course, there had been calls for reform of one
sort or another. The authors of the 1992 MacCrate Report,
for example, had urged law schools to pay greater attention
to teaching “lawyering skills” and the “values of the
profession.”9 Similarly, the authors of the 2007 Carnegie
Report had called on legal educators to develop curricula
that would better integrate “each aspect of the legal
apprenticeship—the cognitive, the practical, and the
ethical-social.”10 For deans and professors who were
enjoying satisfying professional lives under the status quo,
however, it was difficult to perceive a need for fundamental
change. They could take their schools’ rising tuition,
5. See JEFFREY M. ROSENBERG, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT
RECESSION 2007–2010, at 276 (2010) (stating that the recession in the United
States was “the longest since the Great Depression” and providing brief
comparisons to prior economic contractions).
6. See
Data:
LSAC
Volume
Summary,
LSAC,
http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Data/LSAC-volume-summary.asp
(last
visited July 16, 2012) (providing admission data for each year from fall 2002
through fall 2012).
7. See
AM .
BAR
ASS'N,
LAW
SCHOOL
TUITION
1985–2011,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_a
nd_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited
July 17, 2012) (charting the steady rise of tuition rates at public and private law
schools from 1985 forward).
8. Nearly 92% of the Class of 2007, for example, had found employment
within nine months of graduation. See EMPLOYMENT FOR THE CLASS OF 2011—
SELECTED FINDINGS, NAT’L ASS’N LAW PLACEMENT 1 (2012) [hereinafter CLASS OF
2011],
available
at
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2011SelectedFindings.pdf. That placement
figure represented a twenty-three-year high. See id.
9. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 138-41 (1992) [hereinafter THE MACCRATE REPORT].
10. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION
PROFESSION OF LAW 191 (2007) [hereinafter THE CARNEGIE REPORT].
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admission-application, and job-placement numbers as
signals that they were doing their jobs reasonably well.
In the wake of the Great Recession, it is far easier to
find a sense of reformist urgency among legal educators.11
The litany has become familiar. Employment rates for law
graduates have dropped steadily every year since 2008; only
86% of the class of 2011, for example, had landed jobs nine
months after graduation.12 Of those members of the class of
2011 who had secured employment nine months out, only
65% had found jobs for which Bar passage was a
prerequisite—the lowest percentage ever recorded by the
National Association for Law Placement.13 Squeezed by
11. See Hannah Hayes, Recession Places Law School Reform in the Eye of the
Storm, PERSPECTIVES, Spring 2010, at 8-9, 14 (2010) (quoting numerous legal
educators for the proposition that the Great Recession is pushing law schools to
consider a variety of curricular reforms aimed at increasing the marketability of
their students). This is not the first time that global events have spurred talk of
reform in American law schools. Writing during World War II, for example, Karl
Llewellyn and the other members of the Association of American Law Schools’
Committee on Curriculum noted “the widespread dissatisfaction which law
teachers . . . have been experiencing and expressing in regard to their classes
during these war years.” ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH. COMM. ON CURRICULUM, THE
PLACE OF SKILLS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1944), reprinted in 45 COLUM. L. REV. 345,
345 (1945) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM]. Llewellyn and his
colleagues believed they had pinpointed the source of the problem:
We believe [this dissatisfaction] rests on the fact that we have been
teaching classes which contain fewer “top” students. . . . [U]ntil recently
the gratifying performance of our best has floated like a curtain
between our eyes and the unpleasant realization of what our “lower
half” has not been getting from instruction. In the war classes this
curtain is thin, scanty or absent . . . .
Id. Urging law faculties to confront their teaching’s shortcomings, the committee
drew an analogy to America’s manufacturing efforts. Prior to the war, they
wrote, the nation’s methods of production had seemed satisfactory. Id. at 348.
The demands of the war, however, had “forced upon our engineers a recanvass
of production methods from the ground up.” Id. So too, they said, the wartime
absence of some of their most talented students had drawn back the curtain,
revealing the need for American law schools to search for ways to achieve better
educational outcomes for the entire student body. See id. For a brief discussion
of the committee report’s impact, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 214-16 (1983).
12. See CLASS OF 2011, supra note 8, at 1.
13. See id. at 2; see also Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market,
WALL ST. J., June 25, 2012, at A1(“Nationwide, only 55% of the class of 2011 had
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resource-strapped clients, law firms are less willing to hire
graduates who need extensive on-the-job training.14
Meanwhile, tuition at numerous law schools now
approaches or tops $50,000 per year.15 The average law
student graduates with nearly $100,000 in debt, yet is far
from assured of a starting salary that will make that debt
easy to manage.16 Not surprisingly, law schools are receiving
dramatically fewer applications for admission.17 A variety of
forces thus prod us toward a fundamental question: Are we
maximizing the transformative educational potential of our
students’ time with us?
I take up that question in this Article. In doing so, I
frame the query somewhat more narrowly in two different
ways. First, when evaluating whether we are maximizing
the potential of our students’ educational experience, I want
to focus on law schools’ longstanding desire to produce highpowered graduates with analytic skills that are coveted not
only within the legal profession, but in numerous other

full-time, long-term jobs that required a law degree nine months after
graduation.”).
14. See Hayes, supra note 11, at 8 (“Clients hit hard by the recession don’t
want to pay for an inexperienced associate.”); Benjamin Spencer, The Law
School
Critique
in
Historical
Perspective
4
(Mar.
6,
2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017114 (stating that the recession has left law firms
less able and less willing “to subsidize the on-the-job training of law graduates”).
15. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS, at ix (2012) (“Annual
tuition at over a half-dozen law schools topped $50,000 in 2011, with a dozen
more poised to follow. After adding living expenses, the out-of-pocket cost of
obtaining a law degree at these schools reaches $200,000.”).
16. See id. (“Nearly 90 percent of law students borrow to finance their legal
education, with the average law school debt of graduates approaching
$100,000.”); id. at xi (stating that the median starting salary for the Class of
2010 was about $63,000).
17. See Applications Down 15.6%, But Admits Could Be Even Lower, NAT’L
JURIST
(Apr.
24,
2012,
5:00
AM),
http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/applications-down-156-admits-could-beeven-lower (“While the numbers are not final, it appears the total number of
applicants will be down from 87,500 in 2010 to less than 67,000 this year. . . .
This year’s applicant pool will likely be the smallest since 1996, when there
were 21 fewer law schools . . . .”).
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sectors of society as well.18 In an era when jobs are relatively
scarce, it seems especially appropriate to evaluate our
performance through that lens.
Second, I want to focus on the pedagogical power of the
doctrinal courses that have long dominated the curriculum
at American law schools—courses whose titles and
catalogue descriptions indicate that they are aimed at
introducing students to specified bodies of substantive and
procedural law.19 I have, in turn, two main reasons for
homing in on our doctrinal teaching. First, aside from the
occasional addition or rearrangement of courses, our
doctrinal curriculum has emerged largely unscathed from a
century’s worth of talk about law school reform.20 As Nancy
Rapoport has put it, “there’s very little innovation at the
core of legal education. We’re still playing Christopher
Columbus Langdell’s song—not his song of innovation in
legal education, but the monotonous refrain of education in
the form of Socratic classes and case law.”21 To the extent

18. See Robert M. Lloyd, Consumerism in Legal Education, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC.
551, 554 (1995) (noting law schools’ longstanding claim to train their students in
a form of “disciplined thinking” that equips them “to be leaders in business,
government, education, or whatever”); Mary A. Lundeberg, Metacognitive
Aspects of Reading Comprehension: Studying Understanding in Legal Case
Analysis, 22 READING RES. Q. 407, 409 (1987) (“Legal educators profess to build
minds rather than fill them. Indeed, they claim not to teach rules of law, but
rather, to teach students how to think like lawyers.”); cf. Derek C. Bok, A
Challenge to Legal Education, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Fall 1979, at 13 (1979)
(“[L]aw school has always been the last refuge of the able, ambitious, but
vocationally uncertain student.”).
19. See STEVENS, supra note 11, at 210 (stating that, by the late 1940s, law
schools across the country primarily offered “‘bread and butter’ courses” aimed
at teaching the kinds of subject matters that were likely to appear on Bar
examinations) (quoting LOWELL S. NICHOLSON, THE LAW SCHOOLS OF THE UNITED
STATES 21 (1958)); Spencer, supra note 14, at 50 (observing that most law
schools today continue to focus primarily “on doctrinal courses and the
transmission of substantive knowledge”).
20. See Spencer, supra note 14, at 22 (“[W]hen one canvasses the various
assessments of formal legal education over the past 130 years it is remarkable
how consistent the criticisms are and how persistent the Langdellian model has
been in the face of these critiques.”).
21. Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why Real
Change Is So Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 359, 366 (2006); see also THE
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that there have been major curricular reforms over the past
half century, the most significant of them have been
implemented by adding new personnel to law schools’
faculties—clinicians and legal-writing professors, in
particular.22 Even staunch advocates of reform have assured
those of us who teach doctrinal courses that we are
satisfactorily achieving our core historic objectives by using
time-honored instructional techniques.23 If, in reality, the
pedagogical power of our doctrinal courses is overhyped—as
I shall argue it is—then taking a critical look at how we
spend those classroom hours could yield significant
educational gains.
The second reason to focus on our doctrinal courses
springs from the fact that concerns about subject-matter
coverage frequently push both faculty and students to
behave in ways that blunt those courses’ educational
power.24 So far as the faculty’s side of the equation is
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 23-24, 50-51 (observing that the casedialogue method remains law schools’ “signature pedagogy”).
22. See STEVENS, supra note 11, at 214-16 (describing the spread of clinics
beginning in the 1950s); Melissa H. Weresh, Form and Substance: Standards for
Promotion and Retention of Legal Writing Faculty on Clinical Tenure Track, 37
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 281, 284-89 (2007) (describing the rise of legal writing
programs); see also ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING
TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 27 (2007) (“Today, some of the most innovative ideas
about improving law teaching can be found in the scholarship of clinical and
legal writing law professors.”).
23. See, e.g., THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 75 (stating that the
traditional case-dialogue method “seems well suited to train students in the
analytical thinking required for success in law school and legal practice”); THE
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 243 (“Many aspects of the skill of legal
analysis and reasoning, an important element of professional training, have
long been effectively taught through appellate case analysis.”).
24. See infra Part I. Throughout this Article, I use the term “coverage” in a
somewhat negative fashion, insofar as I use it to describe an activity that often
displaces other activities that would be more educationally and analytically
powerful in the classroom. I nevertheless am not using the term “coverage” in
the even more negative sense in which that term is used in some other circles.
Cf. GRANT P. WIGGINS & JAY MCTIGHE, UNDERSTANDING BY DESIGN 16 (2d ed.
2005) (“Coverage is a negative term (whereas introduction or survey is not)
because when content is ‘covered’ the student is led through unending facts,
ideas, and readings with little or no sense of the overarching ideas, issues, and
learning goals that might inform study.”). My perception is that we, in legal

2012]

THE ANALYTIC CLASSROOM

1259

concerned, we have long said that our courses’ subject
matters are often mere vehicles for using appellate
decisions and the Socratic method to teach analytic skills.25
But, as legal educators have recognized throughout this
Langdellian era, the desire to provide students with a broad
survey of courses’ subject matter has always been at war
with the time demands of intensive Socratic instruction.26
With only a few exceptions scattered here and there among
our faculties, that war ended long ago, with the “pure”
Socratic method giving way to less time-consuming
exchanges between faculty and students, greater
transparency in professors’ conveyance of doctrinal
information during those exchanges, and coverage-friendly
lectures whenever Socratic dialogue is incompatible with
the desire to move steadily through material that Bar
examiners or we ourselves deem important.27 If we believe
our rhetoric about the primacy of teaching topictranscending cognitive skills, our doctrinal courses are thus
ripe for reassessment.
As for students, they quickly perceive that good grades
are essential to maximizing their employment opportunities
and that acquiring subject-matter knowledge is essential to
obtaining high marks. Many students orient their behavior
accordingly, even when it comes at the cost of neglecting
opportunities to develop their analytic firepower. Students
commonly resist professors who “hide the ball” through a
rigorous application of the Socratic method,28 for example, or
who publicly push their students to the point of discomfort.29
education, use the term “coverage” to describe what Wiggins and McTighe call
“surveys,” and so I use the term “coverage” accordingly.
25. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 99 (“One could make twenty
courses which we have not, and no school has, and substitute them for twenty
that we give, and no great difference would be made in grand utility.”).
26. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. See Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1684 (1996)
(“The problem, as law students see it, is that the Socratic teacher never stops
the interrogation long enough to allow the students to get a good look at the
ball.”).
29. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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They sometimes opt against taking rigorous courses in
which they believe a top grade will be difficult to earn. 30
Many obtain copies of prior students’ notes with the hope of
anticipating their professors’ Socratic questions, and use
prior students’ outlines and answers to problem sets in
order to ease the burden (or minimize the perceived risk) of
sorting out the course material for themselves.31
In the following pages, I argue that today’s market
pressures on legal education, together with empirical
research about law schools’ educational outcomes and the
emergence of new technological capabilities and
corresponding teaching possibilities, all combine to set the
stage for an innovation-rich renaissance in American law
schools. I argue further that the path to such a renaissance
lies in the willingness of many doctrinal faculty to
internalize the need for reform in legal education, such that
they are pushed in their individual courses to experiment
with new approaches to developing the kinds of analytic
capabilities that law schools have long claimed as the
hallmark of their graduates.32
To illustrate what I mean by “internalizing” the need for
reform, consider one of the ways in which business leaders
have spurred innovation in other settings. As Theodore
Levitt, formerly of the Harvard Business School, explained
in his celebrated 1960 article Marketing Myopia,33 Henry
Ford’s invention of the assembly line did not emerge from
casual reflection about production methods. Rather, it
emerged because he clearly set out his objective—selling
automobiles at a specified low price—and then forced
himself and his employees to develop the innovations

30. I am relying here on my own many conversations with students.
31. See Robert M. Lloyd, Hard Law Firms and Soft Law Schools, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 667, 682-83 (2005) (“Sets of course notes with analyses of all the cases and
answers to all of the problems circulate at most law schools and there is little
acknowledgement of the ethical or pedagogical problems these present.”).
32. Cf. Addison Mueller, There Is Madness in Our Methods, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC.
93, 94 (1950) (arguing that law faculties suffer when their members “become
operators instead of designers”).
33. Theodore Levitt, Marketing Myopia, 38 HARV. BUS. REV. 45 (1960).
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necessary to achieve that goal.34 Ford explained that he gave
his team a target price so low that it would “‘force everybody
in the place to the highest point of efficiency. The low price
makes everybody dig for profits. We make more discoveries
concerning manufacturing and selling under this forced
method than by any method of leisurely investigation.’”35
A comparable path is now available in legal education.
A number of faculty members at Stanford University,
Harvard University, Princeton University, the University of
Michigan,
the
University
of
Pennsylvania,
the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and other
prestigious institutions are gearing up to “flip” some of their
undergraduate courses, using Web-based technology to
replace lectures and thereby free up the classroom for
higher analytic purposes.36 Using similar technology, we
could go a long way toward introducing our students to
foundational principles, doctrinal frameworks, or other
preliminary concepts prior to meeting our students in the
classroom. We thus would be pushed to confront a
provocative question: Building on the materials we would
introduce our students to beforehand, how could we most
effectively use the classroom to increase the clarity and
rigor with which our students think?
I proceed as follows. In Part I, I briefly describe the
persistent tension between subject-matter coverage and
Langdellian teaching techniques. Langdell’s disciples
insisted that, contrary to earlier thinking, the real purpose
of the classroom was to train students to think in lawyerly
ways, and that breadth and depth of subject-matter
coverage could thus be sacrificed to cognitive training.
Sustained criticisms of the techniques that Langdell
popularized have led many professors to reduce the rigor
with which they use those techniques today, and subjectmatter coverage is once again a central programmatic
objective. This emphasis on doctrinal exposure reduces the

34. See id. at 51-52.
35. Id. (quoting HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 146-47 (1922)).
36. See infra Part III.
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time and energy that professors can devote to students’
analytic development.
In Part II, I examine empirical studies that suggest law
schools are doing far less than they often claim to develop
students’ minds in ways that transcend the particular
subject matters we teach. If the empirical evidence revealed
strong improvements in law students’ analytic capacities,
one would be reluctant to tinker with time-honored teaching
techniques. In reality, however, the evidence points in the
opposite direction, provocatively suggesting—even if not
conclusively proving—that we are falling short of our goal of
transforming our students’ cognitive capacities.
Pointing to the pioneering work of faculty members at a
growing number of prestigious institutions, I argue in Part
III that many of us who teach doctrinal courses should use
widely available technology to introduce our students to
portions of our courses’ foundations and frameworks before
they enter our classrooms. We then could use our face-toface classroom sessions for activities that build on those
foundations and frameworks in ways aimed squarely at
strengthening our students’ analytic capacities.
Finally, in Part IV, I suggest a number of ways in which
we might use the newly available classroom time to increase
our students’ analytic power. I do not aim to provide a
comprehensive list of valuable classroom exercises; rather, I
hope to persuade the reader that the power of today’s
common teaching methods pales in comparison to the power
of what we might develop through a period of sustained
innovative thinking.
I. THE COVERAGE QUANDARY
Prior to the pedagogical revolution that Langdell
launched at the Harvard Law School in 1870, instructors at
American law schools typically aimed to give their students
comprehensive overviews of the doctrinal principles
underlying large bodies of case law.37 Instructors provided
broad surveys of the law through lectures and assigned
37. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING
376-77 (1921).

THE LAW
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textbook readings, and often demanded that their students
memorize the relevant doctrines and recite them in the
classroom.38 Langdell famously brought a different set of
teaching techniques to Harvard, and, in the process,
provided a bridge to an era in which many law professors
would insist that doctrinal coverage should be of only
secondary concern. That rhetoric remains common today,
but classroom realities frequently tell a different story.
A. Langdell’s Bridge
Believing that “[l]aw, considered as a science, consists of
certain principles and doctrines,” that “the number of
fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly
supposed,” and that the study of only a “moderate” number
of cases was sufficient to locate those principles, Langdell
concluded that he and his students could ignore huge
swaths of case law that treatise-writers had felt obliged to
cover.39 His assigned readings consisted of a manageable
number of appellate rulings; through Socratic questioning,
he pushed his students to do the hard work of inducing for
themselves the principles that those cases purportedly
embodied.40 (Joining others, I will refer to this as the casedialogue method.)41 Like the lecturers who preceded him,
38. See JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 7-8 (1914); REED, supra note 37, at 376-77; Bruce A.
Kimball, The Proliferation of Case Method Teaching in American Law Schools:
Mr. Langdell’s Emblematic “Abomination,” 1890–1915, 46 HIST. EDUC. Q. 192,
194 (2006).
39. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi-vii
(1871); see also Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691,
708-11 (1995) (describing Langdell’s teaching philosophy).
40. See REDLICH, supra note 38, at 12 (describing Langdell’s methodology);
Carrington, supra note 39, at 708-11 (same). Langdell and other early
proponents of the case-dialogue method also believed that this teaching
technique was superior to its predecessors because it better captured students’
interest. See STEVENS, supra note 11, at 63 (stating that the case-dialogue
method was “more exciting for both teacher and student”); John C. Gray, The
Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE L.J. 159, 159 (1892) (stating that the casedialogue method stimulated greater student interest).
41. See, e.g., THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3 (adopting this
terminology). Although commonly linked, the case method and Socratic dialogue
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Langdell regarded subject-matter coverage as his primary
objective, but believed that the essential subject matter in
his courses could be extracted from a fairly small number of
appellate decisions.42
By the turn of the century, Langdell’s disciples were
distancing themselves from the claim that law was a science
driven by a fixed set of principles, but holding firmly to
Langdell’s classroom reliance upon Socratic dialogue and
appellate rulings.43 Cut free from scientific theories,
proponents of the case-dialogue method shifted its rationale
in an important new direction. Subject-matter coverage was
no longer the premier objective; rather, the chief purpose of
the case-dialogue method was to train students to think in
lawyerly ways.44 The conviction that the method provided
future lawyers with rigorous cognitive training—as well as
the financial benefits of a methodology that enabled a lone
instructor to teach large numbers of students45 and the
reputational benefits of adopting a methodology that traced

are distinguishable; one could question students Socratically about statutes or
other nonjudicial materials, for example.
42. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at v
(2d ed. 1879) (“The object of [this casebook] has been to develop fully all the
important principles involved in the cases, and to that object its scope has been
strictly limited.”).
43. See REED, supra note 37, at 378-79 (stating that, by the late 1880s, it was
evident that there was no fixed set of legal principles that students simply had
to induce from the case law).
44. See ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 134 (2007)
(describing this shift and stating that “[t]he avowed primary purpose of law
school in the United States henceforth was not to teach the law but to teach how
to think like a lawyer”).
45. See STEVENS, supra note 11, at 268 (“It is possible that Langdell’s greatest
contribution to legal education was the highly dubious one of convincing all and
sundry that legal education was inexpensive.”); Carrington, supra note 39, at
748 (stating that the case-dialogue method became prevalent, in part, because it
enabled law schools to enroll large numbers of students without substantially
increasing the size of their faculties); Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with
So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 677 (1935) (stating, in the
context of a critique of the case-dialogue method, that “our Trustees have grown
sleepily comfortable in the feeling that law schools are cheap”).
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its origins to Harvard46—helped fuel the method’s
propagation at law schools across the country.47 As Josef
Redlich observed in his 1914 report to the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching:
In the place of the old ideal of instruction, the ideal of imparting
the greatest possible amount of knowledge, there has arisen a new
ideal: the specific training in that manner of legal thinking which
is peculiar to and necessary for the practising lawyer. . . . [T]here
can be no doubt that with many American law teachers to-day the
tendency is to regard the transmission of positive legal material to
the student as a secondary consideration, compared to the special
48
intellectual training provided by the Socratic method.

For more than a century now, committed proponents of
Socratic teaching have continued to echo the primacy of
cognitive training over subject-matter coverage.49
B. A Century of Push-Back
Despite its ascent to a place of dominance in American
legal education, the case-dialogue method has suffered a
century’s worth of criticism—criticism that has diluted the
46. See Kimball, supra note 38, at 195-96, 220 (concluding that the casedialogue method’s “association with prestigious institutions” was one of several
reasons for its spread).
47. See id. at 196-220 (describing the spread of the case-dialogue method
between 1890 and 1915).
48. REDLICH, supra note 38, at 25; see id. at 24 (explaining that he heard this
rationale “again and again” when visiting American law schools); see also
LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 100 (“We do not purport to teach you the rules you
need to know. . . . On the other hand, we labor diligently and not without skill at
getting you to handle the cases when you find them.”); STEVENS, supra note 11,
at 117 (stating that “the case method came to be regarded less as a means of
transferring information about substantive rules and more as a means of
teaching legal methodology”).
49. See, e.g., Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (SM) (Lecture at Puget
Sound, 1/31/90), 109 HARV. L. REV. 911, 915 (1996) (“The essence of the
[Socratic method] is not recitation but reasoning and analysis that forces the
student to use what he knows (or supposes that he knows) from the assigned
judicial opinion (or statute or other materials).”); Bernard D. Meltzer, The
University of Chicago Law School: Ruminations and Reminiscences, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 233, 241 (2003) (stating that the Socratic method is chiefly and
admirably aimed at teaching analytic skills, rather than black letter law).
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rigor with which law professors commonly implement the
method today. Briefly, these critiques fall into three
categories.
The first set of criticisms concerns the issue of subjectmatter coverage itself. From the launch of the Langdellian
revolution to the present day, many professors have not
been persuaded that doctrinal coverage should be sacrificed
to the degree to which a patient application of the Socratic
method requires.50 After canvassing teaching practices at
American law schools in the 1920s, for example, Alfred Reed
wrote that “[t]he [Socratic] method is so onerous,
demanding as it does perhaps twice as much time as the
[lecture] method, that it increases the probability that the
student will have to omit some branches of the law,
acquaintance with which would be of value to him in his
future practice.”51 Reed’s concern was not an isolated
objection. As historian Bruce Kimball has written regarding
the period from 1890 to 1915, the “frequent objection that
[the] case method did not permit coverage of subject matter
appeared in catalogs, in professional presentations, and in
personal correspondence.”52
With respect to the doctrinal matters that professors do
wish to teach, legal educators have long acknowledged that
the case-dialogue method is an inefficient means of
conveying that information.53 Roy Stuckey and his coauthors
50. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (noting the present-day
emphasis on subject-matter coverage).
51. ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS
STATES AND CANADA 223 (1928).

IN THE

UNITED

52. Kimball, supra note 38, at 226.
53. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM, supra note 11, at 367 (“[C]aseinstruction is a singularly slow and wasteful method of imparting information
about rules of law to any student who has once mastered the proper ‘byproducts’ of case instruction.”) (emphasis omitted); Llewellyn, supra note 45, at
676 (“[I]t is ancient learning that as a purveyor of information the pure casemethod is close to pure waste.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal
Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215 (1948) (“[I]t is obvious that man could
hardly devise a more wasteful method of imparting information about subject
matter than the case-class. Certainly man never has.”); Frank R. Strong, The
Pedagogic Training of a Law Faculty, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 226, 235 (1973)
(making this point).
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point out that “[t]he best method for imparting information
is not likely to be the best method for teaching analytical
skills.”54 This puts professors in a bind: shifting to lectures
or other efficient information-delivery vehicles undercuts
the pedagogical benefits traditionally attributed to the casedialogue method, yet holding firm to the case-dialogue
method precludes coverage of material that many professors
believe their students should know.55 That bind is especially
vexing for faculty members who teach at schools where Barpassage rates are a matter of concern and where coverage of
basic doctrine is correspondingly stressed.56
The second set of criticisms leveled against the casedialogue method concerns the charge that it does not
sufficiently introduce students to skills and activities that
are likely to be important in their professional lives. In
1908, for example, Henry Ballantine sounded a theme that
one frequently hears today—namely, that the case-dialogue
method might prepare students well for a career on the
bench or in academia, but it falls short of preparing
students for the work they will do when representing
clients.57 Leading the way for modern-day advocates of the
problem method, Ballantine urged law faculties to force
their students to work through complex factual disputes
(whether real or hypothesized), rather than repeatedly
study the ways in which appellate courts resolved past
conflicts.58 Other critics have pointed to additional
54. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 44, at 130.
55. See Llewellyn, supra note 53, at 215-16 (noting this quandary).
56. Cf. Douglas K. Rush & Hisako Matsuo, Does Law School Curriculum
Affect Bar Examination Passage? An Empirical Analysis of Factors Related to
Bar Examination Passage During the Years 2001 Through 2006 at a Midwestern
Law School, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 224, 225-26 (2007) (noting the heightened
emphasis placed on “Bar courses” at schools with historic Bar-passage
problems).
57. See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Adapting the Case-Book to the Needs of
Professional Training, 2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 135, 135 (1908).
58. See id. at 135-39; see also COMM. ON TEACHING & EXAMINATION METHODS,
HANDBOOK OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 85-89 (1942) (urging
law professors to move away from the case-dialogue method to the problem
method); Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Teaching Contracts with the Aid of
Problems, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 115, 118 (1916) (making the same argument).
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omissions, such as training in interpreting statutes,59
advising and dealing with clients,60 and evaluating potential
courses of action when the factual record of a dispute has
not yet been developed.61
The third set of long-standing criticisms concerns
doubts about the degree to which the case-dialogue method
really does help students develop the analytic capacities
that are commonly invoked as the method’s leading
justification. I will have more to say on this question in Part
II. Here, I merely want to note that concerns of this sort
have dogged the case-dialogue method for generations.
Some have expressed the view that the method does not
effectively reach students of less than above-average talent,
such that students who are most in need of help with their
analytic skills may be the least likely to receive it.62 Others
have pointed out that most students in large classes are
passive listeners during Socratic exchanges, and have
questioned whether such passivity can yield significant
cognitive gains.63 Numerous critics have said that while the
case-dialogue method holds students’ attention for a
59. See, e.g., REED, supra note 37, at 379 (pointing to this omission in 1921).
60. See, e.g., id. (urging training in client counseling); THE CARNEGIE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 56-57 (lamenting the fact that the case-dialogue method omits
contact with clients).
61. See, e.g., STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 44, at 138 (making this point); Todd
D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV.
597, 600-04 (2007) (elaborating on this argument).
62. See, e.g., THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 71 (observing that the
case-dialogue method might work best when students are already cognitively
operating at a high level); id. at 75 (stating that the method works best for
students who are “primed for challenging analytical work”); Kimball, supra note
38, at 228 (“[A] reason routinely cited against adopting [the] case method, even
at national university law schools such as Columbia and Michigan [between
1890 and 1915], was that [it] worked well with superior students but poorly
with average students.”).
63. See, e.g., REDLICH, supra note 38, at 51 (“[T]he complete effectiveness of
the Langdell method, and for that matter of any instruction which involves an
exchange of questions between teacher and student, is always conditioned by
the requirement that only a limited number shall take part in the exercises.”);
Strong, supra note 53, at 235 (stating that, when the Socratic method is
deployed, “much of the student ‘doing’ must be vicarious” and that “there is
reason to be highly dubious of the effectiveness of vicarious classroom practice”).
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semester or two, students soon grow bored with it and begin
to rely more heavily upon their professor or other sources to
carry the intellectual load.64 Many have observed that
students commonly regard court rulings as authoritative
resolutions of prior disputes; students thus often hurry to
memorize those rulings, these skeptics say, rather than
devote significant energy to critiquing those rulings’
rationales.65 Others charge that the Socratic method—
especially
when
aggressively
implemented—inhibits
learning for those who find the method alienating,
intimidating, or traumatic.66 A number of professors have
64. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 145 (telling second-year students
that because they have become accustomed to the case-dialogue method, they
are likely to be tempted to spend “less time on the cases” and rely more heavily
upon the professor, and to take “[l]ess interest in law, and more in what [the
professor] is likely to expect on the exam”); THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note
10, at 77 (noting surveys indicating that students get more disengaged as they
move through law school, and attributing that disengagement to repeated
exposure to the case-dialogue method); David F. Cavers, In Advocacy of the
Problem Method, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 453 (1943) (“After the first year, the
[casebook] system is not exacting in its demands on any but the morbidly
conscientious student.”); Walter Gellhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law
Study, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2-6 (1964) (observing that second- and third-year
students commonly “become less and less actively involved in the educational
process” and that this disengagement arises, in part, due to boredom with the
case-dialogue method).
65. See, e.g., COMM. ON TEACHING & EXAMINATION METHODS, supra note 58, at
87 (“[S]tudents too often regard the cases as authoritative solutions which they
need only read and absorb; each case becomes an end in itself, and the educative
process stops at the very threshold of its most significant stage.”); Ballantine,
supra note 58, at 117-18 (making this observation and stating that it is a
“critical” weakness of the case-dialogue method); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R.
Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 163, 163-64, 168 (1993) (elaborating on this point); Llewellyn, supra note
53, at 212 (“[W]hen students are provided with a set of [judicial] answers, the
job of getting them to focus attention on the techniques of solution, rather than
on the answers, is difficult.”); Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s
Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 244-45 (1992) (“Despite all
our efforts, many [students] try to skip the emulation [of critical analysis] and
simply learn the rules.”); John Henry Schlegel, Damn! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 765, 767 (1995) (observing that students’ outlines usually contain a
“hierarchical structure of rules, treated as if they were efficacious and as if their
application may require judgment, but not as if their formulation is
problematical”).
66. See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experience at
One Ivy League Law School, in BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL,
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argued that proof of the case-dialogue method’s weakness is
regularly found in students’ end-of-term examinations.67
David Cavers colorfully made the point in 1943: “Every law
teacher who has ever mentioned the matter to me has
testified to the depression of spirit, the black sense of
discouragement, which assails him when, each January and
June, he sees his teaching mangled in the blue books.”68
C. Classroom Realities
In the face of such sustained criticism, it is hardly
surprising that the pure case-dialogue method—in which
the professor refrains from exposition and drives students
through questioning to do the hard work of constructing
analytic frameworks on their own—is virtually extinct.69
Particularly in second- and third-year courses, professors
have become far more transparent in their conveyance of

AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

27, 50 (1997) (“Several women who were intimidated
or not engaged by Socratic-style questioning in large first-year classrooms
stated matter-of-factly that they could not learn in such an environment.”);
Laura Kalman, To Hell with Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 771-72
(1995) (describing the detrimental effects of fear of the Socratic method in her
own education); Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, YALE
REV. L. & SOC. ACTION, at 71, 73 (Spring 1970) (stating that many students
experience Socratic questioning as “an assault”).
67. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM, supra note 11, at 353 (“We do not
believe that any case-instructor can face the ‘lower half’ of his semi-annual set of
blue books, up even through the sixth semester, without recognizing that
current case-instruction is somehow failing to do the job of producing reliable
professional competence . . . in half or more of our . . . graduates.”) (emphasis
omitted); Ballantine, supra note 58, at 118 (“Examination papers are the best
evidence that, in addition to the study of decided cases, the student needs to
study and discuss problems.”).
68. Cavers, supra note 64, at 452; accord COMMITTEE ON CURRICULUM, supra
note 11, at 389 (“We have, above all, to remember our sadly recurring bluebooks with their sadly recurring evidence that except for the more gifted
students all is far from well.”).
69. See Lloyd, supra note 31, at 681 (“The traditional Socratic method, where
the professor not only questioned the student on the material he was to have
read but questioned the assumptions underlying the material and even the
assumptions behind the student’s own belief system, has vanished from
American law schools.”).
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doctrinal information.70 To be sure, the trappings of the
case-dialogue method remain prevalent—we continue to
focus heavily on appellate decisions, and many of us
continue to ask our students numerous questions about the
assigned reading and its underpinnings. Moreover, we often
continue to claim that subject-matter coverage is largely
secondary to cognitive training in our classrooms.71 As a
matter of classroom realities, however, the pendulum has
swung back substantially toward (even if it has not fully
reached) the pre-Langdellian emphasis on subject-matter
coverage.72 Lee Bollinger has lamented, for example, that
even in top American law schools, “[c]overage of doctrine
and fields of law is the predominant classroom activity.”73
Nor is this a recent development. Writing in 1964 from his
post on the faculty at the Columbia Law School, Walter
Gellhorn observed that “[t]he leisurely pace of Socratic
dialogue has given way (much more than is usually
acknowledged) to variations of the lecture, by which more
ground can be covered.”74
With that dilution of the case-dialogue method comes
the risk that the method’s purported educational benefits
70. See Bok, supra note 18, at 13 (stating that “second- and third-year
teachers have abandoned the Socratic method increasingly in favor of the
lecture” and that “the Socratic method has [thus] been abandoned long before
most students have perfected the very habits of rigorous thinking which the
method is so ideally designed to encourage”). But cf. MERTZ, supra note 22, at
142-44 (acknowledging evidence that the Socratic method is “waning,” but
noting that we do not have the precise data required to compare one era to
another).
71. See Lundeberg, supra note 18, at 409.
72. Cf. STEVENS, supra note 11, at 276-77 (stating that, by the 1980s, “in most
schools the case method was said to be less rigorous than it once was”). Our
undergraduate institutions have similarly failed to hold firmly to an insistence
upon teaching critical-thinking skills. See RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROKSA,
ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT: LIMITED LEARNING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 35 (2011)
(“Teaching students to think critically and communicate effectively are espoused
as the principal goals of higher education. . . . However, commitment to these
skills appears more a matter of principle than practice . . . .”).
73. Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the Major American Law School, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 2167, 2174 (1993).
74. Gellhorn, supra note 64, at 3.
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are diluted, as well.75 In 1995, for example, Robert Lloyd
complained that too many law students seem determined
“to get the best credential [they] can with the least effort,”
and that too many professors have accommodated that
desire by greatly reducing their efforts to teach “disciplined
thinking”
through
the
Socratic
method.76
The
disappointments that one sometimes hears expressed in
faculty lounges would indeed suggest that a number of our
third-year students are continuing to struggle in
fundamental ways with the task of conducting competent
legal analysis. On the other hand, in positing a link between
today’s classroom disappointments and the relaxation of the
case-dialogue method, it might be a mistake to assume that
the case-dialogue method of earlier eras ever fully lived up
to its billing. Again, skeptics have long questioned the
method’s capacity to transform students’ analytic abilities.77
Although some students in earlier years testified to the
method’s effectiveness in training their own minds, we lack
empirical data by which to measure the method’s broad
results during those periods.78 Nor can one easily make
reliable armchair assessments. Anecdotal evidence from
Llewellyn, Cavers, and others indicates that the method
yielded less than satisfactory outcomes for a substantial
number of their students,79 but those anecdotes arose before
law schools significantly strengthened their admissions

75. See Carrington, supra note 39, at 748 (“[I]t seems probable that the
benefits of case method teaching have diminished in recent decades. Not only
are law teachers more concerned about possible real harm to students to which
observers point, but they are also perhaps somewhat daunted by heightened
concern that students will perceive them to be doing harm.”); Kalman, supra
note 66, at 772 (“If the Socratic method has been diluted, whatever effectiveness
it once possessed may have dwindled to the point at which law professors should
abandon it.”).
76. See Lloyd, supra note 18, at 552-55.
77. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (noting the lack of empirical
data prior to the 1980s).
79. See supra note 11 (noting Llewellyn); supra note 68 and accompanying
text (noting Cavers).
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standards80—and so perhaps many of those students were
simply incapable of receiving the benefits of an otherwise
powerful set of teaching techniques.81 When trying to assess
the pedagogical impact of today’s more relaxed application
of the case-dialogue method, one cannot make much
headway by drawing historical comparisons.
For present purposes, let us set aside any effort to
compare the case-dialogue method’s effectiveness from one
era to the next. What can we say about the method’s
effectiveness today? By continuing to deploy variations of
the case-dialogue method as law schools’ “signature
pedagogy”82 in doctrinal classes, are we not only teaching
our students legal doctrine, but transforming their analytic
capacities, as well?
II. EMPIRICAL CAUSES FOR CONCERN
In the closing pages of his 1983 study of the evolution of
American legal education, Robert Stevens reflected on law
schools’ historic reluctance to engage in the kind of probing
self-examination that might lay the foundation for
significant institutional change.83 “Even the core case
method,” he wrote, “ha[s] been subject to few empirical
studies.”84 Just a few years later, writing about legal
education from her perspective as an educational
psychologist, Mary Lundeberg similarly remarked upon the
unproven linkage between law schools’ claims and outputs:
80. See STEVENS, supra note 11, at 221-22 n.38 (briefly describing the
emergence of the Law School Admissions Test in the late 1940s and the sharp
increase in law schools’ selectivity in the 1950s); Richard H. Sander & E.
Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a
Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 431, 462-63 (1989) (presenting data
indicating the significant rise in admitted law students’ LSAT scores between
1969 and 1980).
81. Cf. supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting the claim that the casedialogue method only benefits students of above-average intellectual talent).
82. THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 23-24, 50.
83. See STEVENS, supra note 11, at 276-79.
84. Id. at 276; see also id. at 269 (“The ability of the case method to develop
analytical skills and legal craftsmanship was widely accepted [in the post-War
period], even if not readily susceptible of proof.”).
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“Legal educators profess to build minds, rather than fill
them. Indeed, they claim not to teach rules of law, but
rather, to teach students how to think like lawyers.
Whether law schools actually enhance the reasoning skills
of law students has not been verified.”85
A quarter of a century later, we still do not have an
extensive body of empirical work on the educational
effectiveness of the case-dialogue method or on the degree to
which three years in a J.D. program improves a typical
student’s cognitive capacities. Researchers have conducted a
handful of studies in these areas, however, and the results
do not point in a reassuring direction. I group the most
noteworthy research into three categories below: a study
comparing the case-dialogue method to other teaching
techniques, a study evaluating whether third-year law
students show significantly improved analytic capacities in
non-legal settings, and a group of studies testing whether
third-year law students show significantly improved
analytic capacities in legal settings.
A. The BYU Study: Comparing Teaching Methods
Edward Kimball and Larry Farmer—faculty members
at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law
School—got the empirical ball rolling for doctrinal legal
education in 1979.86 They set out to compare three different
ways of teaching Evidence, then a required second-year
course at BYU.87 To facilitate their study, BYU randomly
assigned second-year students to one of three different
sections of Evidence, all taught by Kimball.88 In the first
section, Kimball taught in the conventional way, using a

85. Lundeberg, supra note 18, at 409 (citations omitted).
86. Edward L. Kimball & Larry C. Farmer, Comparative Results of Teaching
Evidence Three Ways, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 196, 196 (1979).
87. Id. at 196. Evidence is no longer a required course at BYU. See
Graduation
Requirements,
BYU
LAW,
http://www.law2.byu.edu/page/
?id=prospective&cat=admissions&content=requirements_for_graduation#view
(last visited July 2, 2012).
88. Kimball & Farmer, supra note 86, at 196.
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mainstream casebook.89 In the second section, Kimball
directed students to read portions of an evidence treatise
and then come to class prepared to talk about assigned
problems that Kimball had written.90 In the third section,
students were instructed to read portions of an evidence
treatise, work through a computer program that presented
them with problems that Kimball had written, compare
their analyses of those problems to Kimball’s own answers
and explanations, and then (at their discretion) come to
periodic class sessions where Kimball would be available to
answer students’ questions.91 At the end of the semester,
students in all three sections took the same final
examination, containing a mix of objective and essay
questions.92 Kimball and Farmer found that the method of
instruction did not have a statistically significant impact
upon students’ ultimate exam performance.93 A brief followup experiment the following year94 reinforced their
conclusion that “[s]tudents can learn Evidence just about as
well by any of several teaching methods.”95
Research on teaching methods in non-legal settings
suggests that Kimball and Farmer’s conclusion should come
as no surprise. Numerous literature surveys have found
that, when researchers try to evaluate the comparative
effectiveness of teaching methods by comparing the average
exam performance of students taught by one method to the
average exam performance of students taught by a different
method, the different teaching methods commonly appear

89. Id. at 196-97.
90. Id. at 197.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 198-99.
93. Id. at 199.
94. In their second experiment, Kimball and Farmer compared the problem
method to the self-instruction method. They found that the students in the
problem-method section did better on the essay portion of the final examination,
but that the two sections’ performances were statistically equivalent on the
other portions of the exam. See id. at 201-02.
95. Id. at 209.
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equally efficacious.96 To be sure, some individual students
learn better when taught by one method rather than
another.97 When comparing the average performance of
students within groups, however, those individual
differences tend to balance out, such that shifting from one
group teaching method to another is unlikely to yield
significant net learning gains for the group as a whole.98
Kimball and Farmer’s small study suggests that the casedialogue method and two of its alternatives are not
exceptions to that rule.99 If the students who were taught
Evidence in the traditional manner developed analytic
capacities that the other students did not, Kimball and
Farmer’s final examination failed to detect it.100
Might Kimball and Farmer’s results simply suggest that
their final examination rewarded knowledge of content to a
greater degree than analytic ability? Could it be, in other
words, that students who have been taught in the casedialogue manner will manifest increased analytic capacities
when those capacities are effectively targeted by a testing
instrument? To answer that question, I turn to two other
sets of studies. The researchers who conducted these studies
did not single out the case-dialogue method for empirical
analysis; rather, they aimed to evaluate the effects of legal
education as a whole. Because variations of the casedialogue method predominate in so many of our doctrinal
classrooms, however, any verdict cast on the overarching
effects of legal education also gives us important
information about the effects of those prevalent teaching
techniques as well.

96. See Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case
Against the Case System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 179-82 (1986) (discussing
several such literature surveys).
97. See id. at 181.
98. See id. at 181-82.
99. See Kimball & Farmer, supra note 86, at 209.
100. See id.

2012]

THE ANALYTIC CLASSROOM

1277

B. The Michigan Study: Testing Analytic Skills in NonLegal Settings
In the mid-1980s, the University of Michigan Law
School’s Richard Lempert joined with psychologists Darrin
Lehman and Richard Nisbett to take a fresh look at the
theory of formal discipline.101 That theory, which traces its
roots to the ancient Greeks and was widely held until the
early twentieth century, posits that training in
mathematics, foreign languages, grammar, logic, or another
rule-driven discipline equips a person to think more
accurately and more precisely in other areas of life.102 The
theory of formal discipline played a leading role in helping
to set educational curricula in the 1800s, when educators
commonly stressed “languages and mathematics and other
subjects deemed useful for formal discipline and . . . largely
excluded the natural sciences and other fields because of
their emphasis on mere content.”103 Beginning with a set of
studies performed by Edward Thorndike in the early
1900s,104 and continuing through much of the twentieth
century, psychologists attacked that theory, arguing that
people learn rules in highly context-specific ways, such that
“[l]earning does not transfer from task to task, and subjects
do not generalize from a set of tasks to the level of abstract
rules.”105
Lempert, Lehman, and Nisbett set out to test their
competing claim that, in fact, there are certain kinds of
101. Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning:
Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOL.
431, 431 (1988).
102. See id.; see also Richard E. Nisbett et al., Teaching Reasoning, 238
SCIENCE 625, 625 (1987) (defining the theory of formal discipline as the notion
that people use “abstract, domain-independent inferential rules to think about
everyday events” and that people’s reasoning ability can “be improved by formal
instruction in the use of inferential rules”).
103. Nisbett et al., supra note 102, at 626.
104. See 2 EDWARD L. THORNDIKE, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE PSYCHOLOGY
LEARNING 403 (1913); EDWARD L. THORNDIKE, THE PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING:
BASED ON PSYCHOLOGY 235-37 (1906).
OF

105. Lehman et al., supra note 101, at 432; see also id. at 431-32 (citing
numerous such claims and related studies).
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ways in which formal disciplinary training can improve a
person’s ability to reason through problems one encounters
in everyday life.106 They posited that there are “pragmatic
inferential rules”—or “schemas”—that people routinely
deploy, and that facility with these rules can be improved
through the kinds of formal disciplinary training one finds
in certain areas of graduate and professional training.107
One such set of rules—which these authors called
“contractual schemas”—follows the form of the abstract
proposition “if p, then q,” but expresses it in terms of
permission or obligation (e.g., “if you want to do X, then you
must first satisfy precondition Y,” or “if X occurs, then you
must do Y”).108 Another such set of rules—called “causal
schemas”—follows the form of the abstract proposition “p if
and only if q,” but makes explicit that proposition’s “ideas of
necessariness and sufficiency in causality.”109
To test their claim, the three authors conducted a study
involving first- and third-year students enrolled in four
different graduate and professional programs at the
University of Michigan: psychology, medicine, chemistry,
and law.110 Their aim was to determine whether students in
their third year of those programs showed greater ability to
engage in statistical reasoning (applying “the law of large
numbers and the regression or base rate principle”),
methodological reasoning (applying “various confoundedvariable principles”), conditional reasoning (applying the
propositions “if p, then q” and “p if and only if q”), and
verbal reasoning (“recogniz[ing] arguments, evaluat[ing]
evidence, and detect[ing] analogies” when confronted with
the kinds of problems that appear in the verbal-reasoning
portions of the Graduate Record Examination and Law
106. See id. at 432-34.
107. See id. at 432-33; see also Patricia W. Cheng, Pragmatic Reasoning
Schemas, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 391, 391 (1985) (arguing that people reason
using pragmatic reasoning schemas, “which are generalized sets of rules defined
in relation to classes of goals”).
108. See Lehman et al., supra note 101, at 432-33.
109. Id. at 433.
110. Id. at 434.
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School Admission Test).111 The authors conducted the study
in two waves—first through a cross-sectional assessment
(contemporaneously testing first- and third-year students in
those four programs) and then later through a longitudinal
study (retesting the first-year students once they reached
their third year).112
In both waves of the study, the raw scores of the thirdyear students in all four disciplines were nearly always at
least marginally higher than those of their first-year
counterparts, but those apparent gains often fell short of
statistical significance.113 In the area of verbal reasoning,
only the medical students’ improvement was statistically
significant; third-year law students’ scores failed to reach
that threshold.114 For our purposes here, that is a notable
finding. The authors found, in short, that when it comes to
evaluating arguments and evidence in the kinds of ways
that law schools—through their use of the LSAT—deem
important for legal analysis, third-year law students at
Michigan showed no demonstrable improvement.115
In the areas of statistical and methodological reasoning,
the third-year psychology and medical students showed
significant improvement in both waves of the study.116 Law
and
chemistry
students
demonstrated
marginal
improvement in their raw scores, but in neither wave of the
study did those apparent gains rise to the level of statistical
significance.117 As the authors pointed out, however, one
cannot necessarily fault legal education for those results,

111. Id. at 435; see also id. at 442 (reproducing an example of each of the four
types of questions).
112. Id. at 434, 436.
113. Id. at 437.
114. Id. (reporting increases of only 5% and 4% for law students in the crosssectional and longitudinal studies, respectively, and stating that medical
students’ improvement was statistically significant in both studies).
115. Id.; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting the verbalreasoning portion of the study).
116. Lehman et al., supra note 101, at 437-38.
117. Id.
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given that law schools do not typically teach “the statistical
and methodological rules of the probabilistic sciences.”118
The study’s results concerning conditional reasoning
were somewhat more favorable. Third-year students in law,
medicine, and psychology all demonstrated raw gains in the
cross-sectional study, though the gains were statistically
insignificant.119 In the longitudinal study, however, thirdyear students in all three of those disciplines showed
statistically significant improvement.120 Lempert and his
colleagues concluded that, contrary to the views of
Thorndike and his successors, formal disciplinary “training
of some kinds has substantial effects on the way people
reason about some sorts of problems.”121 In their view,
students in the fields of law, medicine, and psychology
improve their ability to engage in conditional reasoning not
because they are taught “the rules of formal logic,” but
rather because they are taught contractual and causal
schemas that happen to track basic logical principles.122
With respect to legal training in particular, they argued
that law schools

118. Id. at 440. Perhaps they should.
119. Id. at 438.
120. Id. In a subsequent study focused primarily on determining the effects of
law students’ undergraduate majors on those students’ ability to engage in
deductive reasoning, two other researchers found that there were no differences
in the performance of first-, second-, and third-year students. Mark Graham &
Bryan Adamson, Law Students’ Undergraduate Major: Implications for Law
School Academic Support Programs (ASPs), 69 UMKC L. REV. 533, 547-48, 550
(2001). The authors speculated that their results were in tension with the
findings of Lehman, Lempert and Nisbett because their own, smaller study
included only seventeen third-year students. Id. at 554 (attributing the different
results to their own smaller sample size); id. at 549 (noting that only seventeen
third-year students participated in their study).
121. Lehman et al., supra note 101, at 441; see also id. (“The truth is that we
know very little about reasoning and how to teach it. The one thing we thought
we knew—namely, that formal discipline is an illusion—seems clearly wrong.”).
122. Id. at 438-39; see also Nisbett et al., supra note 102, at 628 (“In our view,
when people reason in accordance with the rules of formal logic, they normally
do so by using pragmatic reasoning schemas that happen to map onto the
solutions provided by logic.”).
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provide substantial instruction and drill in the logic of
permissions and obligations, which can be used to solve problems
in the conditional [if p, then q], and it provides additional
instruction and drill for other contractual relations, particularly
those in which an action must be taken if and only if some other
event occurs, which can be used to solve biconditional problems [p
123
if and only if q].

Their results also indicated, however, that law schools
cannot lay special claim to providing training in conditional
reasoning. Law students’ gains in that area were fully
matched by those of medical students, and the gains of both
law and medical students were comfortably exceeded by
students pursuing graduate degrees in psychology.124
Moreover, on initial pretests of conditional reasoning, law
students in the longitudinal study scored no higher than
other participating students, thereby foreclosing the
possibility that the law students possessed stronger powers
of conditional reasoning at the outset and thus were poised
to make less dramatic improvements during the course of
their studies.125
If we were to look only at the Michigan study, we might
take comfort in the finding that there is a species of analytic
skill in which law students show significant improvement,
but we would have little basis for claiming that law schools
and their famous case-dialogue method provide a uniquely
powerful opportunity to develop those analytic capacities.
Indeed, if the Michigan study were our only guide and
analytic development were our only goal, we would be at
least as likely to refer students to a graduate program in
123. Lehman et al., supra note 101, at 440.
124. Id. at 438 fig.3. Lehman and Nisbett subsequently conducted a similar
longitudinal study of undergraduates at the University of Michigan, following
students in the social sciences, natural sciences, and humanities throughout
their four years of study. Darrin R. Lehman & Richard E. Nisbett, A
Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Undergraduate Training on Reasoning, 26
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 952, 954 (1990). With respect to conditional
reasoning, they found that students in the natural sciences demonstrated
approximately 65% improvement and that students in the humanities
demonstrated approximately 60% improvement. Id. at 958 fig.3.
125. See Lehman et al., supra note 101, at 437 (noting that the only area in
which law students in the longitudinal study initially demonstrated a slight
advantage was in the area of verbal reasoning).
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medicine as to a degree in law, and would be most likely to
urge students to pursue a graduate degree in psychology.
C. Testing Analytic Skills in Legal Settings
In a small handful of studies, researchers have tried to
determine whether third-year law students demonstrate an
increased capacity to engage in the kinds of cognitive
activities for which they are primarily trained: those falling
under the umbrella of “legal analysis.” The most noteworthy
of those studies—and their discouraging results—are as
follows.
1. The Bryden Study. In 1984, the University of
Minnesota Law School’s David Bryden published a
provocative empirical piece in the Journal of Legal
Education.126 Bryden found inspiration for his study in the
absence of any clear evidence to support the claim “that law
professors teach students how to think like lawyers.”127
Bryden set out to determine whether law students improved
their abilities to perform three different kinds of lawyerly
thinking: (1) engaging in functional analysis by trying to
determine the meaning of a rule through reference to the
rule’s purpose; (2) distinguishing between holdings and
dicta in judicial rulings; and (3) interpreting statutes.128
Bryden
wrote
two
different
scenario-presenting
examinations aimed at testing students’ abilities in each of
those three areas, and administered those examinations to
third-year students and entering first-year students at what
Bryden described as “three distinguished law schools”—two
of which routinely appeared on top-twenty lists, and the
third of which often came close.129 With the aid of a research
assistant, Bryden tabulated and evaluated the students’
responses to the questions, fully acknowledging that “the
126. David P. Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 479, 479 (1984).
127. See id. at 479-80.
128. See id. at 481.
129. Id. at 481-83. Bryden ensured that the LSAT scores of the two different
groups were comparable. Id. at 482. For extensive samples of the examination
material, see id. at 485-99.
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grader has discretion in characterizing ambiguities, ipse
dixits, and innuendoes.”130
Bryden was distressed to find that although “[t]he
seniors were nearly always more proficient than the
entering freshmen”—an unsurprising result given that the
entering freshmen did not yet have even a semester of law
school under their belts—“hardly anything was said by a
majority even of the seniors.”131 He found that, in a
discouraging number of instances, third-year students made
fundamental analytic mistakes.132 Bryden thus suggested
that law schools might be overemphasizing subject-matter
coverage to the detriment of analytic training:
[An] important question is whether the second and third years of
legal education add anything to students’ mental equipment
besides substantive rules and policies. It would not be surprising,
given the results of this study, to discover that most students have
nearly as much analytical ability, even in construing statutes, at
the end or even the middle of the first year as they do after three
years. If so, we need to reconsider the purposes of upperclass
133
pedagogy.

2. The Hofstra Study. More than twenty years later,
Stefan Krieger reached a similar conclusion in a small study
at the Hofstra Law School.134 Conceding at the outset that
his methodology was relaxed in ways that other empiricists

130. Id. at 485.
131. Id. at 500.
132. See id. at 502-03 (noting, for example, that many third-year students
failed to spot issues or arguments that Bryden would have expected a welltrained student to identify with ease).
133. Id. at 501; see also id. at 505 (“My own conviction is that we have
overstressed curricular reform while neglecting pedagogic reforms without
which the curricular changes tend to be superficial.”). For a critique of the
Bryden study, see James F. Stratman, The Emergence of Legal Composition as a
Field of Inquiry: Evaluating the Prospects, 60 REV. EDUC. RES. 153, 166-71
(1990) (noting, for example, that Bryden assumed that if a given cognitive
activity was not manifested in students’ written work-product, then the
students did not engage in it).
134. See Stefan H. Krieger, The Development of Legal Reasoning Skills in Law
Students: An Empirical Study, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332, 336, 353-54 (2006).
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could find problematic,135 Krieger explained that he had
conducted an assessment of ten incoming first-year
students, ten students midway through their second year,
and ten third-year students nearing graduation.136 Each
student was presented with a written description of a
hypothetical case involving the possibility of consumer
fraud in the sale of a used car, then was asked to read the
problem and voice his or her thoughts using a “think-aloud
protocol,” so that Krieger would have insight into the
student’s thought processes.137 After the students had
finished reading the materials, they were asked to recall
and describe the case’s relevant facts and to respond to
prompts for legal analyses of various sorts. 138 Krieger found
that although the second- and third-year students were
better able than the entering first-year students to identify
and recall the relevant facts, the third-year students’
performance was no better than that of their second-year
counterparts.139 He further found that the third-year
students did not do appreciably better in their analysis of
the case.140 Krieger concluded that, “in most respects, the
third-year subjects in this study showed only a slight
change in reasoning strategy compared to second-year
students.”141 Like Bryden before him, Krieger thus raised

135. Id. at 333 (acknowledging that his study’s sample size was small and
drawn from a single law school, with no effort to control for differences in
students’ backgrounds or academic achievements).
136. Id. at 336.
137. Id. at 337-40.
138. Id. at 340-41 (explaining that he tracked such things as the participants’
identification of possible applicable legal rules and their identification of
relevant procedural concerns, such as the need for more information or
additional legal research).
139. Id. at 343-45; see also id. at 345 (“These findings appear to raise some
questions about the effectiveness of the final year-and-a-half of law school on
students’ ability to focus on the relevant facts in a legal problem.”).
140. Id. at 349-52.
141. Id. at 352.

2012]

THE ANALYTIC CLASSROOM

1285

questions about the purposes being served by students’ final
semesters in law school.142
3. The Evensen-LSAC Study. The largest and most
sophisticated study in this group was funded by the Law
School Admission Council and published by the LSAC in
2009.143 The study was carried out by Dorothy Evensen (an
educational psychologist at Penn State University), James
Stratman (a rhetorician at the University of Colorado at
Denver), Laurel Oates (the director of the legal writing
program at the Seattle University School of Law), and
Sarah Zappe (an educational psychologist at Penn State
University).144 The study occurred in two phases.145
In 2003, the LSAC agreed to fund the research team’s
effort to create a prototype for a test instrument that would
evaluate “law students’ critical case reading and reasoning
skills.”146 Based upon a review of prior studies in both law
142. Cf. Brian Leiter, A Potted History of American Legal Education and
Scholarship in the 20th Century, with Special Reference to Why There Is No
Longer a Scholarly Wissenschaft in Law, BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REP. (July 11,
2012, 7:52 PM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2012/07/a-pottedhistory-of-american-legal-education-and-scholarship-in-the-20th-century-withspecial-refere.html (“[T]he Langdellian legal Wissenschaft exhausts its
intellectual utility within two years of JD study, and that is, as far as I can tell,
no longer controversial on this side of the Atlantic.”).
143. See DOROTHY H. EVENSEN ET AL., DEVELOPING AN ASSESSMENT OF FIRSTYEAR LAW STUDENTS’ CRITICAL CASE READING AND REASONING ABILITY: PHASE 2,
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL GRANTS REPORT 08-02 (2009), available at
http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/research/gr/pdf/gr-08-02.pdf.
144. Id.;
see
also
Dorothy
Evensen,
PENN
ST.
C.
EDUC.,
http://www.ed.psu.edu/educ/eps/higher-education/directory/dorothy-evensen
(last visited Sept. 25, 2012); James Stratman, U. COLO. DENVER C. LIBERAL ARTS
&
SCI.,
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/CLAS/Departments/
communication/AboutUs/ContactUs/DepartmentDirectory/Pages/JamesStratma
n.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2012); Laurel Currie Oates, SEATTLE U. SCH. L.,
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Faculty/Faculty_Profiles/Laurel_Currie_Oates.xml
(last visited Sept. 25, 2012); Sarah E. Rzasa Zappe, Curriculum Vitae, available
at http://www.personal.psu.edu/ser163/vita.pdf.
145. EVENSEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 1.
146. Id. at 1. Applications of such a prototype could be used to measure
students’ progress during their law school careers. See id. The LSAC and the
research team also hoped to come to a deeper theoretical understanding of “the
information-processing constructs comprising case reading and reasoning
skills.” Id.
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and nonlaw settings, the team identified five assumptions to
guide their efforts: (1) the test should measure students’
ability to read and analyze a case in service to a specific
purpose (just as an attorney reads a case with his or her
client’s specific objectives in mind); (2) the test should
measure students’ ability “to generate and distinguish more
from less purpose-relevant questions to ask” when reading a
case; (3) the test should measure students’ ability to identify
purpose-relevant indeterminacies in a case; (4) the test
should measure students’ ability to raise additional
purpose-relevant questions after identifying purposerelevant indeterminacies in a case; and (5) with respect to
each of those four dimensions of analytic skill, the test
should measure students’ abilities not only when
confronting an individual case, but when grappling with a
series of related cases as well.147
With the help of a panel of legal experts, the team
developed a test involving three short judicial rulings
concerning a Pennsylvania rule that governs appeals from
arbitration.148 They administered the test to 161
volunteering first-year students at five different
(undisclosed) law schools—80 of those students were in
their first semester of law school and 81 were in their
second.149 The researchers instructed the participants to
read the three cases as if they were being asked to prepare
an appeal on behalf of a client whose situation the
147. See id. at 2-4 (emphasis omitted).
148. See id. app. at 44-49 (reproducing the three cases). One member of the
research team had previously used those three cases in a different study. See
James F. Stratman, When Law Students Read Cases: Exploring Relations
Between Professional Legal Reasoning Roles and Problem Detection, 34
DISCOURSE PROCESSES 57, 69-71 (2002).
149. See EVENSEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 4-6. The identity of the law schools
remains confidential. In an e-mail exchange, Professor Evensen told me that one
of the schools is widely regarded as a “national draw” (in the top 50 in U.S.
News’s rankings), two are “regional draws” (in the top 100 in U.S. News’s
rankings) and two are “local draws” (below the top 100 in U.S. News’s rankings).
E-mail from Dorothy Evensen to author (July 8, 2012, 07:31 CST) (on file with
author). Their LSAT ranges for admitted students (25th and 75th percentile
respectively), were as follows: 158 and 165 for the national school, 155 and 161
for the two regional schools, and 153 and 160 for the two local schools. Id.
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researchers described.150 The team then presented the
students with fourteen multiple-choice questions aimed at
evaluating their analytic abilities in the five dimensions
that the team had targeted.151
They found that the second-semester students
performed no better than the first-semester students;
indeed, the second-semester students scored marginally
worse.152 Students in both groups struggled the most when
questions required them to identify strategically useful
questions arising from the cases’ indeterminacies.153 The
research team noted, however, that the study was crosssectional in nature, and that it thus was possible that the
second-semester students who volunteered for the study
were simply less proficient than their first-semester
counterparts.154 Might many of those individual students
show increased ability if tested later in their law school
careers?
For the study’s second phase, the research team thus
set out to determine the degree to which students’ case
reading and reasoning abilities improved between their first
and second years in law school and between their first and
third years in law school.155 They constructed a second
version of the test, again using three short judicial rulings
“that presented the kind of indeterminacies of
interpretation that legal educators have complained
students are poor at analyzing or even recognizing.”156 They
settled on three cases involving allegations by employees
that their employers had violated the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act.157 With the help of eight law
professors, they created an examination consisting of
150. See EVENSEN ET AL., supra note 143, at 4.
151. Id. at 5; see also id. app. at 50-58 (reproducing the fourteen questions).
152. Id. at 7 tbl.2.
153. Id. at 7-9.
154. Id. at 9.
155. Id. at 14.
156. Id. at 10.
157. Id.; see also id. app. at 59-67 (reproducing the three cases).
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fourteen multiple-choice questions.158 Returning to the same
five law schools, the team administered the new version of
the test to 63 students who—now in their final semester of
law school—had taken the first version of the test back
when they were first-year students.159 Using both versions of
the test, they also launched a new longitudinal study
involving 83 students who agreed to take one version of the
test in the spring of their first year and the other version of
the test in the fall of their second year.160
With respect to the new longitudinal study—measuring
analytic progress between the second and third semesters of
law school—the research team found that the students
manifested no improvement whatsoever.161 With respect to
the longer-term study—retesting original study subjects in
their final semester of law school—the team again found no
improvement, even after statistically taking into account
the possibility that the second version of the test might have
been somewhat more difficult.162 While cautioning against
drawing sweeping inferences from these disappointing
results,163 the team concluded that there is good reason to be
concerned about the lack of growth in students’ case-reading
and reasoning abilities during their time in law school.164
158. Id. at 13.
159. Id. at 14.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 15 tbl.8.
162. Id. at 16.
163. Id. (stating that “our [two tests] are very much under development and
require additional scrutiny”).
164. See id. at 39 (stating that “we believe we established that our test[s are]
measuring something important to the literacy and professional development of
law students”). They suggested that perhaps they simply were testing for
growth in skills that are “not stressed or practiced extensively in law schools,”
particularly in the area of identifying legal indeterminacies that are relevant to
one’s litigation purposes. Id. Inspired by the LSAC study, David Herring and
Collin Lynch subsequently conducted a small, one-semester study at the
University of Pittsburgh, seeking to measure the extent to which students’ casereading and reasoning abilities improved after studying the topic of personal
jurisdiction through the case-dialogue method. David J. Herring & Collin Lynch,
Teaching Skills of Legal Analysis: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes? 18-19
(Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper Series Working Paper No.
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*****
If the results of all these studies pointed in opposing
directions or sharply conflicted with one’s own intuitions
about most students’ analytic development, one might
quickly dismiss them, confident that a panel of empiricists
could suggest reasons to resist their results. Although other
doctrinal faculty might be persuaded to the contrary, my
own conviction is that we are not doing as much as we could
to help all of our students increase their analytic abilities in
ways that transcend the particular doctrinal frameworks we
teach. Hoping to be joined by others who are willing to
entertain that possibility, I proceed to consider what we
might do about that problem, and how we might lay the
foundation for a renaissance in legal education in the
process.
III. THE INCIPIENT REVOLUTION
In an April 2012 New Yorker profile, John Hennessy—
president of Stanford University and member of the boards
of directors for Google and Cisco Systems—predicted that
Web-based technologies soon will substantially disrupt
mainstream higher education, just as such technologies
have brought tremendous change to the music and
publishing industries.165 He does not know precisely what
form those disruptions will take, but his prediction of
impending change is unwavering: “‘There’s a tsunami
coming.’”166 Other prominent educators are making the same
2011-16, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1856109. They
found only minor improvement. See id. at 28, 35.
165. See Ken Auletta, Get Rich U., NEW YORKER, Apr. 30, 2012, at 40, 46.
166. Id. at 47. Hennessy’s prediction of a “tsunami” might ring a bell for some
readers who did not read the profile: when listing the reasons for her widely
disparaged effort to oust President Teresa Sullivan, University of Virginia
Rector Helen Dragas prominently cited Hennessy’s prediction and her
frustration that President Sullivan had not been pushing UVA more
aggressively into the world of online education. See Statement from UVA Rector
Helen
Dragas,
DAILY
PROGRESS
(June
21,
2012),
http://www2.dailyprogress.com/news/2012/jun/21/statement-uva-rector-helendragas-ar-2005210/; see also Tamar Lewin, New Meeting Is Set on Fate of
President of University, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2012, at A9.

1290

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

forecast. Lawrence Bacow, a former president of Tufts
University,167 and William Bowen, a former president of
Princeton University and of the Andrew W. Mellon
Foundation,168 are convinced that “online educational
technology will bring about fundamental reform in how
teachers teach and students learn in the years to come.” 169
Clayton Christensen—a member of the Harvard Business
School faculty and an influential scholar on the subject of
disruptive innovation170—argues that competition from
online enterprises “will require traditional universities to
change fundamentally.”171
167. President
Emeritus
Lawrence
S.
Bacow,
http://president.tufts.edu/bacow/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).

TUFTS

U.,

168. William
G.
Bowen,
ANDREW
W.
MELLON
http://www.mellon.org/about_foundation/staff/office-of-thepresident/williambowen (last visited Sept. 25, 2012).

FOUNDATION,

169. Lawrence S. Bacow et al., Barriers to Adoption of Online Learning
Systems in U.S. Higher Education, ITHAKA S+R 6 (May 1, 2012),
http://www.sr.ithaka.org/research-publications/barriers-adoption-onlinelearning-systems-us-higher-education. Bacow elaborates:
The technology is evolving very quickly. I would not assume that what
is available today is what they will be working with in five (or even
three) years. . . . Those presidents, provosts, and deans that are willing
to rethink the traditional lecture-recitation mode of instruction to
incorporate these new technologies are likely to open up far more
possibilities than those that merely try to plug the technology into their
existing curricula. . . . Today’s students have only known a digital
world. In time these students will become tomorrow’s faculty. Thus I
believe change is inevitable. Teaching in the future will involve far
more online instruction than it does today. The only question is how
long will this change take.
Matthew P. Long, Five Questions for Lawrence Bacow, S+R BLOG (May 14,
2012), http://www.sr.ithaka.org/blog-individual/five-questions-lawrence-bacow.
170. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL, at ix, xvii-xviii, 253 (1997).
171. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & HENRY J. EYRING, THE INNOVATIVE
UNIVERSITY: CHANGING THE DNA OF HIGHER EDUCATION FROM THE INSIDE OUT
218 (2011). Ten to fifteen years ago, some were making similar predictions
concerning law schools in particular. See Stephen M. Johnson, Legal Education
in the Digital Age, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 85, 85 (quoting, without the author’s own
endorsement, an individual who predicted at the January 1999 Association of
American Law Schools conference that “‘[m]ost law schools, as we know them,
will disappear, in recognizable form, somewhere in the next five to ten years’”).
Others made bold predictions without the timeframes. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly,

2012]

THE ANALYTIC CLASSROOM

1291

Their certainty of significant change is driven by a
number of developments that have occurred over the past
ten to fifteen years. Those developments help set the
context—both technological and pedagogical—for my own
argument in favor of using Web-based technologies to
restructure the way we in legal education teach doctrinal
courses.
A. Prestigious Universities’ Push for Web-Based Innovation
At about the turn of the millennium, leaders at several
prestigious universities entered a new period of
experimentation with online technologies, convinced that
the Internet could be brought to bear in transformative
ways at the highest levels of American education, and
hoping to position their own institutions at the forefront of
whatever transformations might occur.172 Initially, their
focus was on generating new revenue streams. In 2000, for
example, Columbia University launched an enterprise
called Fathom, believing that, by selling online courses to
the larger public, professors’ teaching could be profitably
monetized beyond the campus’s borders in much the same
way as patents and scientific discoveries.173 Public interest
and revenues fell far short of expectations, however, and
The Structure of Legal Education and the Legal Profession, Multidisciplinary
Practice, Competition, and Globalization, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 480, 480 (2002)
(“The steady expansion of online education poses a threat to the economic
viability of local law schools and some regional law schools.”); Robert E.
Oliphant, Will Internet Driven Concord University Law School Revolutionize
Traditional Law School Teaching?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 841, 877-79 (2000)
(concluding that the answer to the question posed by the article’s title is likely
affirmative); Nicolas P. Terry, Bricks Plus Bytes: How “Click-and-Brick” Will
Define Legal Education Space, 46 VILL. L. REV. 95, 139 (2001) (predicting that
competition from Concord and other online law schools will drive other law
schools toward a “click-and-brick model”).
172. Until the retirement of Professor Peter Martin, the initiative’s chief
proponent, for example, the Cornell University Law School made available
audio online courses in Copyrights and Social Security Law to tuition-paying
students at other law schools. See Peter W. Martin, Cornell’s Experience
Running Online, Inter-School Law Courses—An FAQ, 32 LAW TCHR. 70, 72-73
(2005).
173. See TAYLOR WALSH, UNLOCKING THE GATES: HOW AND WHY LEADING
UNIVERSITIES ARE OPENING UP ACCESS TO THEIR COURSES 24, 28 (2011).
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Lee Bollinger terminated the program in 2003 soon after
assuming Columbia’s presidency.174 The year 2000 also
marked the launch of AllLearn, an effort by Oxford,
Princeton, Stanford, and Yale universities to sell online
courses to the public.175 The four universities hoped to
position themselves as leaders in the Internet era and to
generate a body of data with which to research the
technological and human dynamics of online education.176
Princeton withdrew from the coalition in 2001 with its
provost calling AllLearn “dot-com madness,” and the
remaining universities ended the program in 2006 due to
high costs and a miniscule public response.177
From those failed initiatives, many university leaders
drew the conclusion that people typically are not willing to
pay for online courses that neither carry academic credit
nor lead to a formal degree.178 Focus then shifted to ways in
which universities might make educational content
available to the public free of charge. One such initiative
had begun almost inadvertently at the University of
California-Berkeley in the late 1990s, when Professor
Lawrence Rowe led an effort to provide Berkeley students
with online recordings of numerous Berkeley classes and
decided that it would be easiest to do so in a way that would
allow others to have online access to those recordings, as
well.179 (Today, hundreds of Berkeley recordings are
available to the public on YouTube and iTunes, and have
174. See id. at 33, 41.
175. See id. at 42.
176. See id. at 42-45 (emphasizing that the universities were less interested
than Columbia University had been in making a profit, and were more
interested in conducting research and obtaining an early stake in the world of
online education); see also Scott Carlson, Alliance Backed by Oxford, Stanford,
and Yale Offers Courses to the Public, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 2002, at
A47 (providing an interim assessment of the organization’s finances and
activities and closing with skepticism about the venture’s likelihood of success).
177. See WALSH, supra note 173, at 50.
178. See id. at 56; see also William G. Bowen, Foreword to id. at viii (drawing
from Fathom and AllLearn the “major lesson” that online education does not
provide new revenue streams that universities can readily tap).
179. See WALSH, supra note 173, at 150-53.
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been viewed or downloaded more than twenty million
times.180) In 2001, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (“MIT”) launched OpenCourseWare, a project
that provides online access to syllabi, lecture notes, reading
lists, and assignments for more than 2,000 MIT courses,
and makes available audio or video recordings of numerous
MIT class sessions, as well.181 In 2007, Yale University
launched Open Yale Courses, through which the university
provides the world with free, professionally produced, online
videos of more than forty complete Yale courses, ranging
from Modern Poetry to Game Theory to Death.182
The videos that Berkeley, MIT, and Yale provide
generally consist of recordings of professors in their
classrooms; the material is not specially arranged with the
online student in mind, nor is the online student given an
opportunity to interact with the professor or to assess what
he or she has learned through papers, quizzes, or exams.
Indeed, online viewers are not actually “students” in those
courses except to the extent they choose to see themselves
in that way. The recordings simply provide online viewers
with an opportunity to observe enrolled students’ classroom
experiences and to learn something vicariously along the
way.
A new wave of initiatives—dubbed “MOOCs,” for
“massively open online courses”—are aimed at providing
online viewers with an educational experience designed
180. See id. at 150, 161, 168.
181. See id. at 57, 62, 67. A 2009 study found that the OpenCourseWare
website averaged one million visits per month, including visits from other
educators looking for course-development ideas, from members of the public
seeking to lay out a plan for self-education, and from college and university
students at MIT and elsewhere eager to learn about specific MIT courses. See id.
at 74, 81.
182. See WALSH, supra note 173, at 122 (discussing the program’s launch);
Courses, OPEN YALE COURSES, http://oyc.yale.edu/courses (last visited July 12,
2012) (listing the currently available courses); see also Andy Guess, Open
Courses Open Wider, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 12, 2007, 4:00 AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/12/12/openyale
(reporting
contemporaneously on the initiative’s launch). Viewing some of Yale’s recordings
has been among the many pleasures of writing this Article; they are
exceptionally well produced.
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with online students specifically in mind, providing quizzes
and other assessments to help them monitor their own
learning progress.183 Stanford University helped lead the
way on this front,184 offering three of its computer science
courses online, free of charge, in the fall of 2011.185 The
courses consisted of videos that students could watch at
their own pace, with quizzes and feedback interspersed
throughout.186 One of those courses—Artificial Intelligence,
taught by Sebastian Thrun, then a tenured member of the
Stanford faculty, and Peter Norvig, Google’s director of
research—drew 160,000 students from 190 countries, with
more than 20,000 of those students sticking with it at least

183. See Tamar Lewin, Harvard and M.I.T. Join to Offer Web Courses, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2012, at A18.
184. Stanford has been the most influential leader, but was not the first on the
scene. In 2002, with funding from the Hewlett Foundation, Carnegie Mellon
University began its Open Learning Initiative, a continuing effort to develop
free online courses in which a computer uses a student’s performance on quizzes
to continually adapt the student’s curriculum to his or her own strengths and
weaknesses. See WALSH, supra note 173, at 89-96. Progress has been slow due in
part to the high costs of producing each course; initially, each course cost
approximately $1 million to produce, though that cost has since dropped by
about half. See id. at 101. Today, about a dozen courses are available online free
of charge. See See Our Open + Free Courses, OPEN LEARNING INITIATIVE,
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://oli.cmu.edu/learn-with-oli/see-our-free-opencourses/ (last visited July 12, 2012). Those courses focus on subjects—such as
languages and science—in which questions have “a single correct answer,” and
thus do not include courses from the humanities. WALSH, supra note 173, at 9798. Although Carnegie’s efforts have won a measure of national attention, those
efforts have not transformed the way that Carnegie faculty and students
interact with one another; indeed, many faculty and students on the Carnegie
campus know little or nothing about the Open Learning Initiative. See id. at
108. Stanford’s efforts have already proven to be far more transformative. See
Richard Perez-Pena, Top Universities Test the Online Appeal of Free, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A15 (stating that Carnegie Mellon’s Open Learning
Initiative has been around for a decade, “[b]ut for many educators, Stanford
fired the starting gun last fall”).
185. See Jamie Beckett, Free Computer Science Courses, New Teaching
Technology Reinvent Online Education, STANFORD REP. (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2011/august/online-computer-science081611.html.
186. See id.
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long enough to take the midterm.187 Thrun and Norvig have
subsequently joined with others to create Udacity (drawing
its name from a combination of “university” and “audacity”),
a venture that hires professors to teach free online courses
on scientific or quantitative subjects like computer science,
physics, and statistics.188
Racing to keep pace with Stanford, officials at MIT
announced in December 2011 that they were creating a
venture called MITx to offer free online versions of several
courses to the public.189 MIT explained that its own students
would use the courses as a learning supplement, and that
its researchers would use the courses to learn more about
online teaching, online learning, and computer grading. 190
The first MITx course—Circuits and Electronics, which
went online in March 2012—attracted 120,000 students, of
whom 10,000 remained long enough to take the midterm.191
Later that spring, MIT and Harvard University announced
that they were contributing $30 million each to create a
nonprofit venture called edX—a vehicle for both universities
to offer the public free online courses from the sciences and
humanities.192 In July 2012, the University of CaliforniaBerkeley announced that it was joining edX and that other
institutions were slated soon to follow.193 Harvard
University Provost Alan Garber is among those who see edX
as an opportunity to conduct further research on online
187. See Steven Leckart, The Stanford Education, WIRED, Apr. 2012, at 68, 70,
72-73.
188. See id. at 73-74; see also About Udacity Courses, UDACITY,
http://www.udacity.com/courses (last visited July 13, 2012) (listing Udacity’s
current courses).
189. See Tamar Lewin, M.I.T. Plans to Expand Its Free Online Courses, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at A22.
190. See id.
191. See Lewin, supra note 183.
192. See id.; see also About edX, EDX, https://www.edx.org/about (last visited
June 28, 2012) (providing information about the initiative); Tamar Lewin, One
Course, 150,000 Students, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2012, at ED33 (presenting a
short interview with M.I.T. Professor Anant Agarwal, the president of edX).
193. See Tamar Lewin, Berkeley to Join the Free Online Learning Partnership
EdX, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2012, at A3.
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teaching technologies, explaining that what universities are
doing in the online world a few years down the road will
likely look very different from what they are doing today.194
Several new companies are working with universities to
develop and market their online courses. When the
Washington University School of Law announced in May
2012 that it will join the New York University School of
Law and other institutions that offer wholly online LL.M.
programs, for example, it said that it would be aided in that
undertaking by 2tor, an educational technology company.195
EmbanetCompass claims similar partnerships with the
University of Southern California, Vanderbilt University,
Wake Forest University, Boston University, Brandeis
University, Pepperdine University, George Washington
University, Howard University, and Case Western Reserve
University, among others.196 Kaplan Global Solutions
reports that it has entered into arrangements with George
Washington University, Texas A&M, and George Mason
University, among others.197
Of course, many of these universities’ online courses
may lack some of the advantages that traditionally have
helped draw students to American campuses. The instructor
of a heavily enrolled online course, for example, cannot
readily observe and intuit the needs of his or her students,
develop the mentoring relationships that faculty and
194. See Lewin, supra note 183.
195. See Tamar Lewin, Law School Plans to Offer Web Courses for Master’s,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A11. For information about NYU’s online LL.M.
program,
see
Executive
LL.M.
in
Tax,
NYU
LAW,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/llmjsd/executivellmtax/index.htm (last visited July 13,
2012). Washington University plans to charge its online students the same rate
of tuition that it charges its in-residence students—currently about $50,000 per
year—with 2tor providing marketing and technical support. See Lewin, supra
note 195; see also About, 2TOR, http://2tor.com/about/ (last visited July 13, 2012)
(describing the company’s objectives and services).
196. See
Our
Academic
Partners,
EMBANETCOMPASS,
http://embanetcompass.com/our-partners/our-academic-partners (last visited
July 13, 2012).
197. See
Our
Partners,
COLLOQUY,
http://www.kaplanglobalsolutions.com/index.php/our-partners (last visited July
13, 2012).
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students alike often find so rewarding, or personally answer
each and every student question.198 But few would argue
that those sorts of benefits alone justify the high rates of
tuition that students commonly pay for the privilege of
studying with faculty members face-to-face. Moreover, some
of the disadvantages of online courses will be at least
partially counterbalanced by those courses’ advantages.
Online students, for example, can study at their own pace,
easily review material they are confused about, receive
frequent electronic feedback on their progress, interact in
online forums with students far more diverse than those
commonly found in college classrooms, and gain exposure to
faculty and information they might not otherwise be able to
afford.199 That last advantage is especially powerful. If for
little or no charge students could go online and take a
course from one of the nation’s leading professors at one of
the nation’s leading universities, then why should they pay
remarkably high rates of tuition to take that same course in
person from the same or a different professor?
The number of university leaders and faculty members
who will have to confront that question is poised to
skyrocket in the years ahead, as many of the nation’s most
respected institutions of higher education develop platforms
for conveying to the public—for little or no charge—a great
deal of the information that students historically have paid
tens of thousands of dollars to obtain. There is no reason to
believe, by the way, that the information traditionally
conveyed in law schools’ doctrinal classrooms will remain
exempt from that revolution. Like their counterparts in
other disciplines, many law professors may covet the
opportunity to teach thousands of students around the
world through creative uses of Web-based technologies.
B. The Flipped Classroom
The initiatives I have described thus far all demand
especially strong institutional support, with costs often
198. See Mark Edmundson, The Trouble with Online Education, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2012, at A23 (underscoring this observation).
199. See Lewin, supra note 183.
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running well into the millions of dollars. What I am
proposing for our doctrinal courses requires only a fraction
of that investment, and—so long as one has a technicalsupport specialist nearby to answer initial questions—can
be implemented by individual faculty members working
almost entirely on their own. Indeed, it was an individual
faculty member at Stanford University, acting on her own
initiative, who helped devise the framework.200
In January 2010, Daphne Koller—a member of
Stanford’s computer science faculty—decided to confront a
student-attendance problem in one of her courses. The
course had previously been recorded, and was repeatedly
televised as part of Stanford’s continuing-education
program.201 She found that, when teaching that course,
student attendance would drop off precipitously once
students figured out they could hear substantially the same
lectures without having to appear in the classroom at the
scheduled times.202 Drawing some of her inspiration from

200. In the following paragraphs, I do not mean to suggest that Professor
Koller was the first to combine online and face-to-face components in a single
course. She was not. See I. ELAINE ALLEN ET AL., THE SLOAN CONSORTIUM,
BLENDING IN: THE EXTENT AND PROMISE OF BLENDED EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
5-8
(2007),
available
at
http://sloanconsortium.org/publications/survey/pdf/Blending_In.pdf
(reporting
that a large number of colleges and universities offered one or more courses in
which between 30% and 79% of the material was delivered online and the rest
delivered in the classroom); Robert Kaleta et al., Discovering, Designing, and
Delivering Hybrid Courses, in BLENDED LEARNING: RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 111
(Anthony G. Picciano & Charles D. Dziuban eds., 2007) (offering advice from
instructors who previously had taught courses with a blend of online and faceto-face components). As I will explain, however, Koller was the first (to my
knowledge) to popularize the idea of eliminating lectures from her classroom
meetings and delivering the necessary information beforehand with a
combination of online videos and quizzes. In any event, much of my own
thinking was sparked by news of her work, rather than by news of what other
professors previously had done. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
201. See Nick DeSantis, Online-Education Start-Up Teams with Top-Ranked
Universities to Offer Free Courses, Wired Campus, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr.
18, 2012, 5:01 AM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/online-educationstart-up-teams-with-top-ranked-universities-to-offer-free-courses/36048.
202. See id.
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the Khan Academy,203 Koller decided (as she puts it) to “flip”
her classes by preparing a series of online videos and online
quizzes for her students—thereby conveying the
information that she previously had taught in conventional
lectures—and using the newly available classroom time to
interact more directly with her students by presenting them
with interactive problem-solving activities, reviewing
material they were finding especially difficult, and the
like.204 In a December 2011 New York Times column titled
Death Knell for the Lecture, Koller explained her
philosophy:
Some argue that online education can’t teach creative problemsolving and critical-thinking skills. But to practice problemsolving, a student must first master certain concepts. By
providing a cost-effective solution for this first step, we can focus
precious classroom time on more interactive problem-solving
activities that achieve deeper understanding—and foster
creativity. In this format, which we call the flipped classroom,
teachers have to interact with students, motivate them and
205
challenge them.

Joined by her Stanford colleague Andrew Ng, Koller has
founded a for-profit company called Coursera, built in part
on the flipped-course philosophy.206 Buoyed by the receipt of
203. See John Markoff, Online Education Venture Lures Cash Infusion and
Deals with 5 Top Universities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2012, at B4 (citing Koller for
the proposition that the Khan Academy “pioneered” the idea of the flipped
classroom). Salman Khan, a hedge-fund manager, founded the Khan Academy
after he posted videos on YouTube aimed at helping his cousin with her math
homework, then discovered that his videos were attracting an enormous number
of viewers. See Laura McKenna, The Big Idea that Can Revolutionize Higher
Education:
‘MOOC’,
ATLANTIC
(May
11,
2012,
10:50
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/the-big-idea-that-canrevolutionize-higher-education-mooc/256926/. Today, with support from Google
and from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Khan Academy provides
more than 3000 online videos on a wide range of subjects. See id. Sebastian
Thrun drew some of his inspiration from the Khan Academy, as well. See
Leckart, supra note 187 (describing Thrun’s attendance at a March 2011 lecture
by Khan); see also supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text (describing
Thrun’s teaching innovations).
204. See Beckett, supra note 185; DeSantis, supra note 201.
205. Daphne Koller, Death Knell for the Lecture: Technology as a Passport to
Personalized Education, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, at D8.
206. See Markoff, supra note 203.
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$16 million in venture capital in April 2012, Coursera
initially entered into partnerships with Princeton
University, the University of Michigan, the University of
Pennsylvania, and Stanford University.207 By July 2012,
they had added several more major institutions to the list,
including the California Institute of Technology, Duke
University, Johns Hopkins University, the University of
Virginia, and the University of Washington, among
others.208 Faculty members from the participating schools
are helping Coursera develop online courses from across the
curriculum.209 For online students not enrolled at those
institutions, the courses will offer opportunities for selfpaced instruction. For students in residence, however, the
hope is that the educational experience will be far more
powerful. A number of faculty members intend to use their
online Coursera materials to replace their classroom
lectures, thereby freeing up the classroom for more
pedagogically powerful activities.210
Koller predicts that the increasing availability of welltaught free or low-cost online courses will push universities
“to change, because they will not be able to charge students
for content any longer.”211 Prominent voices in the
mainstream media are making the same prediction. In May
2012, for example, David Brooks wrote in the New York
Times that “[o]nline education could potentially push
colleges up the value chain—away from information
207. See Rip Empson, Online Education Startup Coursera Lands $16M from
Kleiner & NEA, Adds John Doerr to Its Board, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/18/coursera-raises-16m/; DeSantis, supra note
201.
208. See Tamar Lewin, Universities Reshaping Education on the Web, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2012, at A12.
209. See Courses, COURSERA, https://www.coursera.org/#courses (last visited
July 9, 2012) (listing numerous courses in subjects ranging from computer
science to history). For courses in the humanities—where testing is made more
difficult by virtue of the frequent absence of right and wrong answers—Coursera
plans to experiment with peer assessments and crowdsourcing as vehicles for
providing individual students with valuable feedback. See Pedagogy, COURSERA,
https://www.coursera.org/#about/pedagogy (last visited July 13, 2012).
210. See DeSantis, supra note 201; Pedagogy, supra note 209.
211. McKenna, supra note 203 (referencing Koller).
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transmission and up to higher things.”212 Writing in the
same forum soon thereafter, Thomas Friedman praised
Coursera’s model: “Welcome to the college education
revolution. Big breakthroughs happen when what is
suddenly possible meets what is desperately necessary.”213
At bottom, Koller and her colleagues see their enterprise as
a tactical response to the “tsunami” in higher education that
Stanford President John Hennessy and others have
predicted.214 “‘You can be crushed or you can surf,’” Koller
says, “‘and it is better to surf.’”215
C. Empirical Effectiveness
Of course, one would not want to make online content
an integral part of one’s teaching unless there were good
reasons to believe that the Internet provides an effective
vehicle for conveying propositional information. The
empirical data on that point are promising.
In September 2010, the United States Department of
Education released a major report on the comparative
effectiveness of online and face-to-face teaching.216 The
report’s authors, led by educational psychologist Barbara
Means,217 conducted a comprehensive examination of the
research literature from 1996 through July 2008, reviewing
212. David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Campus Tsunami, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2012, at
A29.
213. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Come the Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2012, at A25.
214. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (quoting Hennessy).
215. McKenna, supra note 203 (quoting Koller).
216. See BARBARA MEANS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN ONLINE LEARNING: A META-ANALYSIS AND REVIEW
OF
ONLINE
LEARNING
STUDIES,
at
xi-xii
(2010),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/tech/evidence-based-practices/finalreport.pdf.
217. Means is the director of SRI International’s Center for Technology in
Learning. See Lab + Center Directors, SRI INT’L, http://sri.com/about/people/labcenter-directors (last visited July 1, 2012). SRI International describes itself as
“an independent, nonprofit research institute conducting client-sponsored
research and development for government agencies, commercial businesses,
foundations, and other organizations.” About Us, SRI INT’L, http://sri.com/about
(last visited July 1, 2012).
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all published empirical work comparing online and face-toface education.218 In keeping with their commission from the
Department of Education, their primary objective had been
to provide “research-based guidance about how to
implement online learning for K-12 education and teacher
preparation,” but they discovered—usefully for our purposes
here—that most of the extant research focused on adult
learners in higher education and other settings.219
Based on their analysis of dozens of empirical studies,
the research team concluded that purely online instruction
tends to be “as effective as classroom instruction but no
better.”220 That result is significant, but not surprising;
there is little reason to suppose that substantially the same
instruction delivered online and delivered face-to-face would
consistently yield different learning outcomes.221
The research team’s findings were more dramatic when
they examined studies comparing a blend of online and faceto-face instruction with purely face-to-face teaching: those
studies indicated an average of 35% stronger learning
outcomes for students taught in a blended format.222 Means
and her coauthors stressed that there is nothing about a
218. See MEANS ET AL., supra note 216, at ix.
219. Id. at xi-xii; see also id. at 13 (stating that the research team zeroed in on
ninety-nine empirical studies in particular, only nine of which involved students
in K-12 schools); id. at 17 (explaining that approximately half of the targeted
ninety-nine studies involved students enrolled in programs for academic credit).
220. Id. at 18; see also id. at xv (stating that “the learning outcomes for
students in purely online conditions and those for students in purely face-to-face
conditions were statistically equivalent”); Francine S. Glazer, Introduction, in
BLENDED LEARNING: ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES, ACROSS THE ACADEMY 2 (Francine
S. Glazer ed., 2012) (“A large body of literature, often categorized as the no
significant difference literature, is often cited in support of the contention that
there is no discernible benefit in the learning outcomes of students taught
online compared to students taught in a face-to-face environment.”). For the
comparable reflections of a Yale University librarian who has frequently taught
online courses for library schools, see Todd Gilman, Combating Myths About
Distance Education, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Feb. 26, 2010, at A41.
221. Cf. MEANS ET AL., supra note 216, at 40 (“The fact that the majority of
studies found no significant difference across media types is consistent with the
theoretical position that the medium is simply a carrier of content and is
unlikely to affect learning per se.”).
222. See id. at xv, 19.
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blend of online and face-to-face instruction, per se, that
should improve student learning.223 Rather, the significantly
improved outcomes for students taught in blended settings
may flow simply from the fact that those students are
exposed to more instructional time and to a greater variety
of instructional materials than students whose primary
instructional encounters take place in the classroom.224
How, then, might law schools bring blended learning to
their doctrinal courses, weaving together the best uses of
online and face-to-face instruction?
D. Law Schools’ Doctrinal Courses
Ever since the Langdellian revolution of the late
nineteenth century, subject-matter coverage and cognitive
development have battled for primacy in law school
classrooms.225 We have purported to achieve both objectives
simultaneously through the pedagogical techniques we
employ, particularly through our practice of questioning
students about appellate rulings.226 The historical and
empirical records suggest, however, that those objectives
often sit in strong tension with one another, and that
223. See id. at xv.
224. See id. They returned to that point in the report’s closing pages:
Studies using blended learning . . . tend to involve more
learning time, additional instructional resources, and course
elements that encourage interaction among learners. This
confounding leaves open the possibility that one or all of these
other practice variables, rather than the blending of online and
offline media per se, accounts for the particularly positive
outcomes for blended learning in the studies included in the
meta-analysis.
Id. at 52. In one study, for example, researchers found that English-as-a-foreignlanguage students performed much better when their classroom instruction was
supplemented by online activities and exercises. See Reima S. Al-Jarf, The
Effects of Web-Based Learning on Struggling EFL College Writers, 37 FOREIGN
LANGUAGE ANNALS 49, 50-55 (2004). It is difficult to discern whether those
online activities and exercises made the crucial difference, or whether the
study’s results turned simply on the fact that students in the blended
environment received greater amounts of instructional time. See id.
225. See supra Part I.A.
226. See supra Part I.
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faculty and students alike commonly make choices that
prioritize doctrinal coverage over analytic development.227
The key to changing that stubborn dynamic lies in
loosening the Langdellian link between teaching students
doctrine and developing students’ minds.228 By using Webbased technologies—technologies that are likely to become
pervasive in mainstream higher education regardless of our
initial eagerness to embrace them229—faculty can expose
students to some of their courses’ foundations and
frameworks before they enter the classroom. Confronted
then with the need to rethink the chief purposes of live
classroom sessions, faculty can focus on developing
activities that build on those foundations and frameworks
in ways aimed squarely at strengthening students’ analytic
227. See supra Parts I and II.
228. Having opened this Article with a ruefully fatalistic epigraph from
Llewellyn, it bears noting that Llewellyn later insisted upon pedagogical reform,
and that the direction in which he pointed involved loosening the Langdellian
link as I have described it here. In 1948, Llewellyn noted the pedagogical
problems created by
the hugely growing quantity of information about subject matter which
is needed for competence in the discipline. The pressure to expand the
amount of “just plain law” “covered in class” has of course greatly
increased the tendency in case teaching to concentrate upon subject
matter at the expense of training in craft-skills. Nor could anything be
a less happy development.
For information, as such, can be packed into books. Its acquisition can
be guided by syllabus and lecture. That is what books, syllabus, and
lecture are for, whereas the case class is a class in doing—though the
doing be mental and verbal; it is a cooperative, supervised, systematic
exercise in diagnosis of a problem; in organization of data; in the arts of
reaching for, building, and testing solutions or arguments, of making
reasoned judgments of policy and putting them to the test; an exercise
in the craft-skill—and the human skill—of accurate, orderly, persuasive
formulation in language of thoughts that need such organization and
expression in order to accomplish a given purpose.
Llewellyn, supra note 53, at 215; cf. Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal
Education’s “Wicked Problems”, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 978 (2009) (proposing
that professors teaching large, upper-division courses rely heavily upon lectures
to convey information, thereby laying the groundwork for smaller, more
specialized courses in which professors can more easily deploy other teaching
techniques).
229. See supra Part I.A-C.
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capacities and solidifying students’ understanding of the
course material in the process.230
The technology for teaching students prior to meeting
them in the classroom is widely available and fairly
inexpensive; there is no need to invest millions of dollars
unless, like Stanford, Harvard, Berkeley, MIT, and others,
an institution wishes to be able to enroll tens of thousands
of students in a single online course and provide each of
those students with a complete learning experience.
Conveying information to students one will meet later in
the classroom is less complicated. The current market
leader for such technology appears to be Panopto, a
company founded in 2007 by individuals associated with
Carnegie Mellon University.231 Professors at Carnegie
Mellon initially developed the technology for the purpose of
enabling faculty members to share recordings of their
classroom lectures with students and colleagues who could
not originally attend, though the technology was conducive
to a range of other uses, as well.232 By October 2011,
Panopto had entered into more than four hundred
230. See H.G. Schmidt, Foundations of Problem-Based Learning: Some
Explanatory Notes, 27 MED. EDUC. 422, 425-26 (1993) (“One of the reasons . . .
that [medical] students seem to be unable actually to use in a clinical setting
what they have learned previously through books and lectures is that their
knowledge is not yet organized in a way suitable for the kind of tasks required
of them in that setting. It is generally assumed that the necessary restructuring
of the knowledge base only takes place in response to the demands of the tasks
posed.”). In 1948, Llewellyn himself urged law faculties to explore ways to
satisfy coverage demands outside of class, so that face-to-face class time could be
spent on more pedagogically powerful activities. See Llewellyn, supra note 53, at
215-16.
231. See About Panopto, PANOPTO, http://www.panopto.com/video-capture-andmanagement-software-company (last visited July 23, 2012) (describing the
company’s founding); Panopto Reaches 400 Adoptions and 2.7 Million Students,
PANOPTO, http://www.panopto.com/news/panopto-reaches-400-adoptions-and-27million-students (last visited July 23, 2012) (“Over the last three years, Panopto
has deployed more campus-wide adoptions than all other lecture capture
vendors combined . . . .”). Needless to say, I have no connection whatsoever with
Panopto; I offer its technology only as a prominent example of what is currently
available to faculty members on many university campuses, including my own.
232. See Panopto: Interview with Ryan Jennings, M62 (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.m62.net/presentation-skills/presentation-technology/panoptointerview-with-ryan-jennings/.
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institutional license agreements,233 making the odds
reasonably good that the reader’s home institution already
has enabled its faculty members to use Panopto’s technology
in their courses.
As a starting point for cautious users, the software
enables professors to make audiovisual recordings of their
classroom lectures and then supply those recordings online
to their future students.234 Alternatively, an instructor could
sit in his or her office with a webcam and record podcasts of
lectures. In either of those ways, a faculty member could
create a library of doctrinal presentations comparable to the
lectures that BARBRI markets online to law students and
individuals preparing for their Bar exams.235
We would be missing significant opportunities, however,
if we used the technology merely to teach in ways that have
the look and feel of traditional classroom presentations. The
technology enables professors to be much more creative in
their efforts to convey information in a manner aimed at
awakening student interest and laying the foundation for
higher-level analytic work. Working from his or her
233. See Panopto Reaches 400 Adoptions and 2.7 Million Students, supra note
231.
234. See About Panopto, supra note 231.
235. See
1L:
The
First
Year
Law
Student,
BARBRI,
http://www.barbri.com/students/firstYear.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (follow
“Online Video Lectures” hyperlink) (providing samples of online lectures). On
that score, for those who are deeply skeptical about the value of Web-based
technology in legal education, it is worth remembering that Bar-takers
frequently rely upon recorded online presentations to learn areas of the law in
which they did no formal coursework. Indeed, not even recorded lectures are
necessary to learn new areas of law. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal
Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 615 (1984)
(noting that students spend a lot of classroom time studying doctrinal
frameworks that they could learn just as effectively on their own). We might
argue that the subject matters we teach are marked by all manner of subtleties
necessitating classroom treatment. At the end of the semester, however, most of
us administer examinations that call upon students to identify and apply
doctrinal principles that pertain to hypothetical factual scenarios—precisely the
same activities that Bar examiners ask our graduates to perform, even in areas
of the law that many of those graduates have never formally studied. Students
quickly learn those new areas of law by working their way through a series of
readings and lectures.
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computer, a faculty member can record presentations in
which the visual components are the displayed contents of
his or her own computer screen.236 An instructor can thereby
create a presentation containing a sequence of texts, graphs,
drawings, PowerPoint slides, and photographs237—the
software simply records those screen images, while
simultaneously recording whatever the instructor says as
the images are displayed.238 With a digital tablet, an
instructor can write and draw diagrams on the displayed
images, such as by marking up a statute, annotating in the
margins of a judicial opinion, or using the screen in the
same ways one would use a chalkboard.
Although my primary aim here is to promote a means of
reserving the classroom for advanced analytic activities,
using Web-based technology to teach our students carries
other benefits, as well. Students can watch presentations
multiple times, for example, when they find the material
especially tricky. If the online presentations are sufficiently
well indexed, students can easily find materials they wish to
review—something that research indicates students find
beneficial.239 Professors can intersperse their presentations
with short questions or exercises aimed at helping students
monitor their own learning—interventions that research
236. See Enterprise Demo, PANOPTO, http://www.panopto.com/showcase (last
visited July 17, 2012) (providing a series of short presentations on Panopto’s
capabilities).
237. See id. Panopto’s software evidently does not currently permit one to
record the audio component of video clips that one inputs into a Panopto
presentation. See id. One thus would have to provide students with a separate
link to any such videos that one wanted students to see and hear.
238. See id. Of course, this practice raises copyright implications that will have
to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. It merits noting, however, that officials at
Berkeley and Yale have decided not to worry very much about being sued for
copyright infringement based upon the content of faculty members’ online
presentations and have said they will be aggressive, if necessary, in making
arguments based upon fair use. See WALSH, supra note 173, at 210-13.
239. See Dongsong Zhang et al., Instructional Video in e-Learning: Assessing
the Impact of Interactive Video on Learning Effectiveness, 43 INFO. & MGMT. 15,
24 (2006) (“Our study demonstrated that simply incorporating video into elearning environments may not always be sufficient to improve learning.
Interactive video that provides individual control over random access to content
may lead to better learning outcomes and higher learner satisfaction.”).
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indicates can improve students’ learning.240 Whenever it is
appropriate, professors can reuse their recorded
presentations from semester to semester, thereby enabling
themselves to redeploy some of their time and energy to
other teaching needs. The technology also opens the door for
methods of instruction that might not work as well in a
large classroom. A professor might prepare an online
presentation, for example, in which he or she demonstrates
how an effective reader problematizes a judicial opinion,
statute, or other legal text by raising questions about its
contents during the reading process.241
Perhaps the most practical ancillary benefit of using
Web-based technology to introduce students to basic
doctrinal information is that the students whom law schools
will be most eager to recruit in the years ahead are likely to
expect it. As a starting point, students today already are far
240. See Tianguang Gao & James D. Lehman, The Effects of Different Levels of
Interaction on the Achievement and Motivational Perceptions of College Students
in a Web-based Learning Environment, 14 J. INTERACTIVE LEARNING RES. 367,
375-76, 380 (2003) (finding that students in online learning environments
perform better when they are periodically presented with multiple-choice or
true-false questions or when they are asked to generate examples or scenarios
based on the presented material, compared to students who merely watch the
online presentations); MEANS ET AL., supra note 216, at 45 (concluding, based on
numerous empirical studies, “that promoting self-reflection, self-regulation and
self-monitoring leads to more positive online learning outcomes”). See generally
THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 10, at 188-89 (encouraging law faculty to
provide students with feedback during the semester through formative
assessments, rather than relying almost exclusively upon end-of-term
summative assessments).
241. See Dorothy H. Deegan, Exploring Individual Differences Among Novices
Reading in a Specific Domain: The Case of Law, 30 READING RES. Q. 154, 163-64
(1995) (finding, based on empirical research, that high-performing law students
problematize a legal text as they read it by asking questions about the text’s
meaning or likely direction, noting possible inconsistencies or weaknesses in the
text’s arguments, and the like); id. at 166 (cautioning that the research does not
make clear whether there is a cause-and-effect relationship between using such
strategies and receiving higher grades); Peter Dewitz, Legal Education: A
Problem of Learning from Text, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 225, 240-42
(1997) (encouraging professors to model effective case-reading strategies for
students); Fajans & Falk, supra note 65, at 192 (encouraging professors to “try
to show how complex reading really is, how we create texts as we read, and how
profoundly interesting and rewarding it is to listen hard and pay attention to
what we hear as we read”).
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more comfortable with educational uses of digital
technologies than many of their professors.242 If the “MOOC”
initiatives I have described243 bear fruit at Stanford,
Harvard, Yale, and elsewhere, undergraduate students at
elite institutions are going to become accustomed to viewing
online presentations when preparing for class. So long as
those undergraduates’ professors devise productive ways to
fill their newly available classroom time, those students are
going to arrive at our doorstep embracing pedagogical
norms that are very different from those to which we were
exposed during our own formal schooling. In the eyes of
future students, law schools that fail to capitalize on the
power of online technologies in an effort to make the
classroom experience more powerful might seem like dusty
relics of an inefficient pedagogical past.
*****
Clayton Christensen, of Harvard Business School,
writes that, “[b]efore long, even the best-taught face-to-face
courses will be hybridized, suffused with online
components,”244 and that the most successful universities
will be those that “embrace the learning advantages to be
found across the spectrum that runs from fully face to face
to fully online instruction.”245 The explosion of interest
among leading universities in companies like Coursera and
edX suggests Christensen is correct. It increasingly appears
that institutions that stubbornly restrict themselves to
traditional teaching techniques will find it difficult in the
years ahead to justify their current cost structures and will
find themselves pushed ever closer to the sidelines in the
market for students seeking a transformative education.

242. As former Tufts University President Lawrence Bacow puts it, “[t]oday’s
students have only known a digital world. In time these students will become
tomorrow’s faculty. Thus I believe change is inevitable. Teaching in the future
will involve far more online instruction than it does today. The only question is
how long will this change take.” Long, supra note 169.
243. See supra Part III.A-B.
244. CHRISTENSEN & EYRING, supra note 171, at 340.
245. Id. at 328.
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Regardless of whether or when those macro-level
forecasts are borne out, Web-based technology provides
individual faculty members today with an opportunity to
increase the value of their students’ educational experience.
Building on the doctrinal information to which we would
introduce our students beforehand, how could we most
effectively use our classrooms to increase the clarity and
rigor with which our students think?
IV. THE ANALYTIC CLASSROOM
In the pages that remain, I do not aim to provide a
comprehensive list of classroom exercises that will increase
students’ analytic firepower. We still do not know how best
to train students to think more clearly and more rigorously,
particularly in large-enrollment classes where limitations
on the professor’s time and energy preclude frequent
individualized feedback and interaction.246 It thus is too soon
to prescribe one or more precise methodologies to
supplement or replace the case-dialogue method. What we
need now is a period of broad experimentation—not
necessarily experimentation of a formal, rigorously
empirical sort, but experimentation of the kind that we all
246. See Lehman et al., supra note 97, at 441 (“The truth is that we know very
little about reasoning and how to teach it.”). Such research is not, however,
nonexistent. See, e.g., Diane F. Halpern, Teaching Critical Thinking for Transfer
Across Domains, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 449, 451 (1998) (proposing a researchbased model for teaching critical-thinking skills, portions of which have
influenced the activities I suggest here in Part IV). Derek Bok has usefully
discussed the issue—albeit at a high level of abstraction—in the context of
teaching critical-thinking skills to undergraduates:
[P]assive lecturing and drill can help students memorize rules and
concepts and apply them to a limited range of problems similar to those
covered in class, but they do little to equip undergraduates to apply
their knowledge to new problems. Merely inviting students to ask
questions or allowing them to carry on a formless discussion among
themselves is not much better. Instead, instructors need to create a
process of active learning by posing problems, challenging student
answers, and encouraging members of the class to apply the
information and concepts in assigned readings to a variety of new
situations.
DEREK BOK, OUR UNDERACHIEVING COLLEGES: A CANDID LOOK AT HOW MUCH
STUDENTS LEARN AND WHY THEY SHOULD BE LEARNING MORE 116-17 (2006).
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do when we are inspired to get at least an initial sense of
how we and our students will respond to new things in the
classroom. We certainly would benefit from formal empirical
analysis of our pedagogical options, but we first need to
generate those options. What follows is my own contribution
to the initial pool of possibilities.
A. Problematizing Through Premise-Identification
In the mid-1980s, a survey of college professors
representing a number of disciplines revealed that one of
the most common weaknesses in students’ analytic thinking
is “accepting the central assumptions in an argument
without questioning them.”247 Anecdotally, this appears to
be a particular problem for many law students, who often
are too quick to accept courts’ pronouncements as if those
rulings flowed inevitably from prior law.248 As Elizabeth
Fajans and Mary Falk wrote in the Cornell Law Review
twenty years ago, “[e]ven the best and brightest students
too often scan judicial opinions for issue, holding, and
reasoning and call that ‘reading’. . . . To be effective
counselors and advocates, lawyers cannot take legal
documents at their word.”249
In an effort to help students learn how to problematize
legal texts in strategically useful ways, professors could
devote some of their face-to-face sessions to working
together as a class to explicate, as exhaustively as possible,
the logical structure of selected judicial opinions. We could
ask students to identify every premise in a court’s
argument, starting with the premises that explicitly appear
in the opinion, but then moving to the critically important
247. Donald E. Powers & Mary K. Enright, Analytical Reasoning Skills in
Graduate Study: Perceptions of Faculty in Six Fields, 58 J. HIGHER EDUC. 658,
670 (1987); see also id. at 662-63 (describing the mechanics of the survey of
faculty members in the fields of English, education, psychology, chemistry,
computer science, and engineering).
248. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (noting this critique).
249. Fajans & Falk, supra note 65, at 163; see also Deegan, supra note 241, at
161-63 (discussing the importance of being able to problematize a text while
reading it); Dewitz, supra note 241, at 246 (noting the pedagogical value of
teaching students to deploy “problem formation strategies”).
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implicit premises that evidently guided the court’s
judgments about where to begin and end its explicit
argumentation. In the first such exercise or two of a given
semester, we could push the identification of implicit
premises back deeply into the world of jurisprudence—the
world from which courts purport to draw their authority to
speak authoritatively about the law’s demands—in an effort
to short-circuit many students’ instinctive willingness to
accept what a court says simply because a court said it.
Once students have fully elaborated the court’s argument,
they then could work together to identify the argument’s
vulnerabilities and ambiguities and discuss ways in which
those vulnerabilities and ambiguities might be exploited or
ameliorated by future courts and litigants.
B. Socratic Writing
Even in large-enrollment courses, faculty could
transform their classrooms into a setting where each
student must regularly express important ideas in writing
and where analysis of that writing is the focus of classroom
discussion. Of course, we already often place the spotlight
on students’ spoken words, through Socratic dialogue. But
the analytic precision required by written communication,
particularly in the field of law, is far greater than is often
required in oral exchanges, even when one participant in
those exchanges is a Socratic instructor. Requiring students
to express themselves in writing thus opens up additional
teaching opportunities for the professor and gives students
yet more practice with a mode of communication that will be
central to their professional careers.
To make it possible, one would need things that already
are commonly found in law schools today: a laptop in front
of each student, wireless access to the Internet, a computer
at the front of the room for the professor, a means of
projecting the professor’s computer images onto a large
screen, and a technical-support person willing to do some
setup work prior to the beginning of the semester. Once
students were in the classroom, the professor would ask
each student to draft or edit a short text, such as a short
statutory provision, or a clause in a contract, or a case’s
holding, or the rule that emerges when one synthesizes a
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line of cases, or a paragraph-long rebuttal to a majority
opinion that the class has previously read. Students would
be given a short period of time to draft their texts. Using
“wiki” technology or another suitable vehicle,250 students
then would click a button on their computers to post their
passages on a nonpublic webpage. By clicking on a student’s
name or photo, the professor then could “call on” any
student in the room, immediately displaying that student’s
text on the large screen at the front of the room.
Alternatively, the professor could pull up multiple student
drafts at once in order to compare different students’ work.
Those texts could then become the focal point for whatever
analytic teaching purposes the professor deems most
appropriate.
C. Reverse-Engineering Exams
In one of my own courses (Federal Courts), I have
sometimes set aside a day for what I describe as an examwriting activity. In preparation for that class, I tell my
students about a week in advance that I want them to
review their notes up to that point in the semester and then
write a traditional essay question, consisting of a page-long
factual scenario, aimed at testing the question’s readers on
their ability to deploy multiple portions of the course
material. On the designated day, the students bring four or
five hard copies of their questions to class, and I break them
into groups of that same size. Within their separate groups,
they exchange copies of their questions with one another,
then work their way through them one by one, first trying
to identify the legal issues that the scenario’s author
intended to target and then discussing what they would
regard as a first-rate analysis of those issues.
There have been semesters in which, due to the press of
time, I have omitted this hour-long activity (thus
illustrating one of my own decisions favoring subject-matter
coverage over students’ analytic development). When I have
made time for the exercise, however, student response has
250. Here at the University of Iowa, our technical-support specialists have told
me that they can set this up using “parent” and “child” wiki pages.

1314

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

been highly positive. Students often find that writing a good
factual scenario is far more difficult than they imagined
because they have to go back over the course material, think
hard about the kinds of scenarios in which that material
would be implicated, and then construct a situation in
which a number of challenging legal questions are
presented. During the class session itself, the volume of the
separate group discussions quickly rises, as students
compare their class notes, argue with one another about the
best understanding of the course material, and call me over
to help them work through their disagreements.
D. Interdisciplinary Critiques
Law, of course, is not an autonomous discipline;
economics,
sociology,
psychology,
political
science,
philosophy, literary analysis, and other fields of academic
inquiry can usefully shed light on the legal system and the
choices actors make within it. Although legal scholarship
has been heavily influenced by other disciplines,
interdisciplinary perspectives have not made comparable
headway into many of our classrooms.251 As Lee Bollinger
writes, “[i]t is as if law schools are stuck between the
Langdellian revolution of the late nineteenth century and
the interdisciplinary revolution of the late twentieth
century.”252
A faculty member could devote any number of class
sessions to bringing interdisciplinary perspectives to bear
on the course’s doctrinal material. A conventional way to
achieve that objective would be to assign various readings
for class discussion. Professors might engage more of their
students, however, if, at the beginning of the semester, they
designated a number of disciplines whose insights the class
will explore throughout the course and then asked each of
their students to sign up to become classroom “experts” for
one of the designated disciplines, based on their
undergraduate majors or current personal interests.
Professors could then assign a carefully selected handful of
251. See Bollinger, supra note 73, at 2173.
252. Id.
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scholarly writings to the members of each designated group,
thereby introducing (or reacquainting) them with some of
their chosen discipline’s terminology and insights. From
time to time throughout the semester, students from the
various disciplinary groups could be called upon to talk
about the analytic perspectives that their disciplines might
offer on the doctrinal material then under discussion.
E. Ends-Means Thinking and Confronting the Unknown
A cluster of persistent objections to the case-dialogue
method focuses on the thought- and creativity-blunting
effects of continually studying courts’ legally authoritative
rulings. In his 1984 piece on clinical legal education, for
example, Anthony Amsterdam criticized law schools for not
focusing more heavily on ends-means thinking, in which
students must confront the uncertainties that arise when
one evaluates a range of possible outcomes for a client and a
range of possible means of achieving those outcomes.253 Roy
Stuckey and his coauthors similarly complain that the casedialogue method does not help students prepare for careers
in which they will have to help their clients construct
factual worlds and in which they will have far more latitude
than an appellate judge to pursue creative problem-solving
possibilities.254 All of this relates to what college educators
from across the disciplines identify as a critically important
analytic skill: “[r]easoning or problem solving in situations
in which all the needed information is not known.”255
We can work to develop our students’ skills in these
areas—without losing any of the attention-grabbing drama
that flows from studying real-life disputes256—by using the
classroom to delve deeply into the choices made by litigators
long before their clients’ disputes landed in front of a judge.
Consider, for example, the story underlying the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Texas’s ban on
253. See Amsterdam, supra note 235, at 614-15.
254. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 44, at 138-39.
255. Powers & Enright, supra note 247, at 670 (emphasis omitted).
256. Cf. Carrington, supra note 39, at 746 (observing that case narratives are
often more interesting than abstract lectures).

1316

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

same-sex sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.257 As Dale Carpenter
reports in his recent book Flagrant Conduct, the attorneys
for the two accused men faced a number of challenges when
constructing their case, beginning with the fact that their
clients—fairly unsympathetic characters living in a
rundown neighborhood outside Houston—were not partners
in a relationship and likely never even engaged in sexual
activity with one another on the night they were charged
with violating the anti-sodomy statute.258 The defendants’
attorneys worked hard to deflect attention from those facts
and to construct a picture of the sort that ultimately
appeared in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Lawrence
majority: a picture of two adults charged with doing nothing
more than physically expressing the intimacy of a close
relationship.259 (Hence the title of Dahlia Lithwick’s review
of Carpenter’s book: Extreme Makeover.260) How should an
attorney weigh justice for her criminally charged client
against justice for others who might benefit if her client
foregoes a viable defense? What ethical implications does
that balancing act entail? What were the possible legal
theories available to the Lawrence defendants, and why
might they have prioritized some of those theories over
others? What strategies are available for attacking
precedent that weighs squarely against one’s client, like the
precedent that stood squarely in the path of the Lawrence
defendants?261 Of course, these are the very sorts of
questions that a professor asks one’s students when using
the traditional case-dialogue method. But when students
perceive that the most important item on a day’s classroom
agenda is to master the doctrinal specifics of the court’s
ruling, those questions risk being treated superficially, as
257. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
258. See Dahlia Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of
Lawrence v. Texas, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2012, at 76, 76-77.
259. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring.”).
260. Lithwick, supra note 258, at 76.
261. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s
anti-sodomy statute).

2012]

THE ANALYTIC CLASSROOM

1317

brief diversions from the main event. By addressing the
doctrinal mechanics of the court’s ruling ahead of time, a
professor could clear the way for a class discussion and for
role assignments that are focused more squarely on other
analytic challenges.
F. The Case-Dialogue Method (Old School)
Although I have reservations about whether this is a
path that ought to be widely pursued, it bears noting that
restructuring our teaching in the ways I am proposing
would enable a professor—for some portions of his or her
courses—to revert to the style of case-dialogue instruction
that first brought Langdell’s methodology the reputation of
prioritizing analytic development over subject-matter
coverage.262 By teaching segments of important doctrinal
material online, a professor could reserve other portions of
the course for teaching in the patient, time-consuming
manner that Langdell’s methods require.263 With respect to
the areas of law set aside for the classroom, the professor
could be non-transparent in his or her conveyance of
doctrinal propositions, pushing students to do the heavy
lifting on their own.
CONCLUSION
When Yale University launched its Open Yale Courses
initiative in 2007,264 Ramamurti Shankar and Langdon
Hammer were among the first Yale faculty members who
volunteered to have their courses recorded and made freely
available on the Internet—Professor Shankar presented
Fundamentals of Physics and Professor Hammer presented

262. See supra Part I.A (describing the views of Langdell’s early disciples).
263. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (noting the method’s time
demands). Much the same can be suggested for professors who favor the
problem method. See id. Using online technology to carry the burden of
introducing students to a portion of a course’s doctrinal material, a faculty
member could spend significantly more time discussing factual scenarios. See id.
264. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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Modern Poetry.265 Like other participating Yale professors,
however, both men worried they would see a drop in
classroom attendance once students figured out that, by
viewing the online recordings, they could vicariously take
part in a prior semester’s coverage of the same material.
Shankar solved that problem by simply declaring that he
would never teach the course again.266 Hammer said that he
planned to take a break from the course and that, if he ever
returned to it, he might require his students to watch the
videos beforehand and then use the classroom to discuss the
material in greater depth.267 The attendance problem they
feared was the same problem that Daphne Koller later
confronted in a computer science course at Berkeley, when
many students opted to watch a series of Koller’s videotaped
presentations rather than attend her lectures in person.268
Those concerns about student attendance lead to a
wonderfully provocative question: Of what use is the
classroom when students already have heard a professor—
whether their own or another respected scholar at a
different university—take at least a first cut at explaining
much of the information on which students traditionally
have expected to be tested?
That is precisely the question that we who teach
doctrinal courses should force ourselves to answer. Indeed,
doctrinal professors have particularly good reasons to
rethink their classroom objectives in fundamental ways.
The continuing demand for broad subject-matter coverage,269
our tired reliance upon diluted forms of the case-dialogue
method,270 students’ common reliance upon prior students’
class notes and outlines271 (resources that serve as proxies
265. Both courses remain available online today. See Courses, OPEN YALE
COURSES, http://oyc.yale.edu/courses (last visited July 24, 2012).
266. Guess, supra note 182 (quoting Shankar).
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 201-10 and accompanying text (describing Koller’s
dilemma and her subsequent co-founding of Coursera).
269. See supra notes 26-27, 50-52 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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for the class recordings that posed problems for Shankar,
Hammer, and Koller272), empirical indications that law
schools are not transforming their students’ analytic
capacities in the ways they intend,273 heightened economic
pressure to maximize the value of law students’ educational
experiences,274 and the increasing pedagogical use of Webbased technology in prestigious undergraduate programs 275
all point toward the need for significant change.
It is time, in short, to bring our teaching methods more
fully into line with our convictions. Langdell’s early
disciples were certainly right about one thing: the highest
purpose of legal education should not be to fill students’
minds with content, but rather to train students to think
more analytically.276 Derek Bok’s observations regarding
undergraduate education more than a quarter of a century
ago remain apt for legal education today:
Merely accumulating information is of little value to students.
Facts are soon forgotten, and the sheer volume of information has
grown to the point that it is impossible to cover all the important
material or even to agree on what is most essential. . . . The
ability to think critically—to ask pertinent questions, recognize
and define problems, identify the arguments on all sides of an
issue, search for and use relevant data, and arrive in the end at
carefully reasoned judgments—is the indispensable means of
277
making effective use of information . . . .

To help students increase their analytic capabilities, we
must relax the longstanding link between teaching students
doctrine and developing students’ minds. We need not make
the entire shift overnight. Beginning by selecting just one or
two segments of each of our doctrinal courses,278 we could
272. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.
274. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part III.A-B.
276. See supra Part I.A.
277. BOK, supra note 246, at 109.
278. Because the case-dialogue method effectively grips most students’
attention for at least a semester, it probably is best to exempt the first semester
of required courses from significant experimentation, at least until we have
refined our upper-division methodologies. See Bok, supra note 18, at 13
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gradually develop our individual methods of teaching
online, experiment with different in-class analytic activities
to find what works effectively for our students and suits our
individual teaching styles and strengths, and take
advantage of some of the insights and innovations that
undoubtedly will emerge from prestigious universities’ new
commitment to teaching through the Internet. But we do
need to move steadily toward a system in which introducing
students to course material is merely a prelude to an even
more analysis-intensive classroom experience. If we pursue
that agenda creatively, we can help lead American legal
education into a long-overdue period of innovation, and we
and our successors can soon look back on law schools’
current difficulties with gratitude for the push.

(praising the case-dialogue method as a tool for teaching first-year courses, but
observing that “the law school experience tends to grow repetitive, and interest
declines steadily throughout the last two years”); see also supra note 64 (citing
additional authorities on this point).

